Local Ties in Spatial Equilibrium

Mike Zabek∗

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Abstract

People who live in declining areas are more likely to have been born nearby, which implies that they have idiosyncratic ties to where they live. Labor demand shocks to places where people have higher levels of these local ties, proxied by their birth places, lead to less migration and larger movements into and out of the labor market. A model of spatial equilibrium that includes a distribution of workers’ preferences for living in their birth places matches these facts and suggests further implications. Declines in local productivity lead to lower migration elasticities and larger declines in real wages after further declines in productivity. Population can take generations to adjust, since ties can only be reallocated slowly. Across a wide class of models, lower migration elasticities make subsidies to local areas more efficient, since they change fewer people’s locations. Local subsidies are more efficient in declining areas, where they are the most common.

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In spatial equilibrium, a marginal worker will be equally well off, no matter where she lives (Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982)). However, most people have strong preferences about where they want to live. Kennan and Walker (2011), for example, find that people are willing to pay around $20 thousand per year to live in the place where they were born.¹ Do these preferences have implications for spatial equilibrium? In this paper, I use reduced form regressions, a parametric model, and a sufficient statistics approach to examine the importance of these local ties in spatial equilibrium.

Local ties are stronger in areas that are losing population, and they lead to lower migration elasticities. Some people will accept lower real wages to live near where they were born, so locals make up most of the population in areas where population is declining. Locals who stay bid down wages and bid up housing prices, leading to larger declines in real wages than if they had left. These declines in real wages make it more difficult to pull people in from other places, since there is only a small pool of outsiders who would move to an area with such low wages. In a declining area, then, fewer people will migrate after a change in wages, and the migration elasticity is lower.

Migration elasticities determine the distribution of welfare in spatial equilibrium, so they are extremely important for policy. After adverse events, migration acts as a form of insurance, cushioning residents’ wages by lowering the supply of labor. After an influx of governmental assistance, however, migration can be undesirable. If the assistance attracts people, then the increases in labor supply can undo its benefits to locals. Using a sufficient statistics approach, I show how the migration elasticity determines the welfare impacts of a subsidy across a wide class of models of spatial equilibrium. I estimate migration elasticities across areas with different levels of local ties to show how they can have meaningful impacts on the costs of a simple local subsidy, like the substantial subsidies that the US tax code gives to rural areas (Albouy (2009)).

There are interesting dynamics around the formation of local ties in particular areas. Strong local ties tend to be the result of population decline, since few people move to shrinking areas. Areas where population is increasing, however, tend to have residents with weaker local ties, since most residents were born somewhere else and moved there. Eventually, however, these residents either have children, or they form ties on their own. This means that more people are becoming tied to growing places, and this higher level of local ties itself implies a future increase in population. In the future, there will be more people with idiosyncratic attachments to growing places than there were in the past. This tends to increase each area’s growth rate in the future. There is a unique steady state, but it takes a long time to reach it.²

¹Large migration frictions are a common feature in the literature. Bound and Holzer (2000), Notowidigdo (2011), Molloy, Smith and Wozniak (2011), Saks and Wozniak (2011), Ganong and Shoag (2012), Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl (2013), Yagan (2013), Chetty et al. (2014), and Huttunen, Moen and Salvanes (2015) (among others) have emphasized how migration appears to be surprisingly limited, particularly among people without college degrees. Several other structural models of individual migration decisions, including Coate (2013), Kleemanns (2015), Oswald (2015), and Diamond (2016) have also found that people tend to have strong preferences for living close to where they were born.

²Rappaport (2004) finds a similar dynamic, where even very small migration frictions can imply that adjustments take a long time in models of migration. Empirical studies by Bartik (1993) and Beaudry, Green and Sand (2014) also find that migration adjustments appear to be similarly slow.
Following previous empirical studies, I model local ties as a utility benefit from living where one was born, which can represent many important underlying processes. The most obvious local ties are people’s connections to local friends and family. People build social networks in particular areas that help them to socialize, as well as to find jobs, insure against hard times, and navigate various information asymmetries. Children often provide care for elderly parents, and several studies have suggested that there are important advantages for young children of having parents nearby.\(^3\)

I establish the relationship between migration elasticities and levels of local ties using two types of labor demand shifters. The first, developed by Bartik (1991), projects national changes in employment onto local areas using employment shares in various industries based on the assumption that the initial industry shares are unrelated to changes in local labor supply (Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2017)). The second, developed by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), projects the impact of competition with Chinese firms onto local areas, also based on initial industry shares. After these labor demand shocks, I find that wages, labor force participation, and unemployment change by more in areas with stronger local ties. In areas with weaker ties, however, population adjusts by more, presumably through migration.

To give some idea of how local ties develop, and how they impact spatial equilibrium in the long term, I analyze a parametric model of spatial equilibrium. In the model, people have a distribution of preferences about their homes, and this leads to the selection dynamics that I mentioned above. People who lack strong ties to their homes move to growing areas, and people with stronger ties stay in their birth places. People with strong ties make up a larger proportion of the population in areas with declining populations, and declining places have lower migration elasticities.

The parametric model illustrates how two identical shocks can have different effects, if they happen in succession. After two negative shocks, for example, the first shock will lead to a population with stronger local ties, and the higher levels of local ties means that the second shock will change wages by more than the first.

Ties can be reallocated, as new people are born in growing places, but the process is slow, and real wages will diverge from their steady state values until it has concluded. Intuitively, people will be willing to give up more to live in declining areas, since people still have ties in these places. People’s willingness to live there leads real wages to be depressed, and this continues until local ties are reallocated. It can take several generations for ties to be reallocated after a one time, permanent decrease in productivity.

To show the importance of migration elasticities for welfare, I use a sufficient statistics approach to analyze the impact of a local subsidy, meant to represent a number of policies that have different impacts across areas. In a general model of spatial equilibrium, a cash subsidy to an individual area will decrease welfare in proportion to its impact on where people live, which is measured by

\(^3\)There are several relevant literatures in economics on many of these phenomena. Topa (2011) provides an overview of the literature on local networks and job referrals, which emphasizes the importance of both large social networks and geographic proximity in finding a job. Several papers examine how proximity can help to facilitate intergenerational transfers, either from parents to children, or children to parents. Examples include Konrad and Kunemund (2002), Hank (2007), Rainer and Siedler (2009), Kaplan (2012), and Coate (2013), Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes (2015), and Coate, Krokikowski and Zabek (2017).
the migration elasticity. This generalizes several previous discussions of place based policies, since it provides general conditions that imply that the distortion will be a function of the size of the subsidy times the migration elasticity.\footnote{The formula are similar to those in Kline and Moretti (2014b).} In addition to place based policies, the dynamic applies to other policies that are more generous to particular areas. The most obvious is the bias towards low productivity, high amenity, often declining areas that Albouy (2009) argues is inherent in the US income tax code.

The connection between migration elasticities, decline, and the welfare implications of local policies is particularly relevant for policymakers interested in reducing geographic inequality by implementing place based policies. An important concern about place based policies, highlighted by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008), Kline and Moretti (2014b), and Neumark and Simpson (2015), among others, is that they offer an incentive for people to stay in declining places. This incentive can lead to inefficiency, particularly given findings that growing up in a declining area can lead to worse outcomes in adulthood.\footnote{Several studies find relationships in terms of a number of different outcomes. Studies of the Moving to Opportunity experiment, for example, find that young children earn more in adulthood if they live in lower poverty areas as children (Chetty, Hendren and Katz (2015)) and that adults are in better health after they move (Ludwig et al. (2013)). There also appears to be very different levels of intergenerational income mobility across areas (Chetty et al. (2014)) and there is some evidence that living in particular areas leads to worse outcomes in adulthood (Chetty and Hendren (2017)).} If people who live in declining areas are unlikely to move, however, then there is much less concern about the incentive effects of subsidizing declining areas. Investing in disadvantaged communities would be a more viable strategy, if the investments are well designed and well managed.

This paper also furthers the literature on internal migration by integrating microeconomic findings with aggregate spatial equilibrium.\footnote{Seminal papers in the literature on internal migration and its effects on labor markets include Sjaastad (1962), Blanchard and Katz (1992), Bound and Holzer (2000), Kennan and Walker (2011), and Moretti (2013). Another literature examines the determination of wages and rents in response to differences in productivity and amenities in spatial equilibrium, including Rosen (1979), Roback (1982), Topel (1986), and Albouy (2016). Yet another literature focuses on economic convergence within countries, including Barro et al. (1991), Alesina and Barro (2002), and Ganong and Shoag (2012).} Several models, following from Kennan and Walker (2011), have begun to give a much more intricate picture of various factors affecting migration, including the importance of gross flows of migrants. One important fact that has emerged from these papers has been that people appear to value living in particular places, for seemingly idiosyncratic reasons. For example, Gregory (2013), finds that home owners were willing to pay significant amounts to continue living in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. Cadena and Kovak (2016) find that immigrants to the United States are much more likely to migrate for economic reasons than people who were born in the US. This highlights the importance of a relatively small group of migrants, as opposed to a larger group of people living closer to their homes, in establishing spatial equilibrium.

Several papers have also incorporated a more micro founded view of migration into models of spatial equilibrium within countries, though none have focused on local ties. Many of these have focused on modeling advances. For example, Coen-Pirani (2010), Davis, Fisher and Veracierto
(2013), and Monras (2015) model gross flows of migrants, a distinction that is important for thinking about the importance of local ties. Another important advance was the estimation of a structural demand system, including endogenous amenities, by Diamond (2016). Like Diamond (2016), I use a mixed logit model with random coefficients, but unlike that paper, I do not attempt to fully estimate it. Instead, I rely on indirect inference to identify important parameters and a sufficient statistics approach.

Another important, related literature has focused on the measurement and implications of frictions in the supply of housing in particular areas. It can be difficult to supply new housing because of geography (Saiz (2010)) and zoning (Gyourko, Saiz and Summers (2008)). Ganong and Shoag (2012) and Hsieh and Moretti (2015), for example, argue that this is an important factor limiting migration into more productive areas. Similarly, the durability of the existing housing stock can make the supply of housing quite inelastic in the short term (Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Notowidigdo (2011)).

Local ties influence migration in a way that is distinct from the durability of housing, despite the fact that both can lead to small migration elasticities in places where population is declining. The main piece of evidence for this is that labor demand shocks do not appear to have different effects on the price of housing in areas with different levels of local ties; this suggests that areas with stronger local ties do not necessarily have lower housing supply elasticities. Similarly, when I include several controls for the level of house prices, I still find that areas with higher levels of local ties have lower levels of migration after a shock.

Local ties can have meaningfully different implications than durable housing stocks. Even if housing is durable, it still depreciates at least 3 percent per year, and it is built in very specific lots. For example, it seems apparent that local ties should be more important than durable housing in the city of Detroit, whose population has declined by more than half since 1950. In the process of that decline, much of the housing stock has been destroyed either by nature, by vandalism, or through demolitions by the city. The city’s decline in population has not been accompanied by a decline in the population of the broader metropolitan statistical area, which has actually gained population since 1950. One explanation for the relative stability of the population of the MSA, and of many other MSAs, is that people’s local ties kept them close to family and friends in the area, but not necessarily the city itself.

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6I do not model endogenous amenities.

7Yet another related literature examines if householders holding negative equity on mortgages, after episodes of falling housing prices, discourage people from moving after negative shocks in particular areas. This literature includes Henley (1998), Ferreira, Gyourko and Tracy (2010), Modestino and Dennett (2012), and Valletta (2013), among others. Several papers find some effects, but these are generally fairly modest, especially for labor market outcomes (where the actions of renters can undo the actions of home owners).

8Ramey and Shapiro (2001) also show how business capital can also be quite durable, which would lead to similar dynamics on some, but not all, dimensions as a friction due to people’s reluctance to move from their homes. For example, it is not clear why the durability of local business capital would lead to people leaving the labor force in larger numbers. Rappaport (2004), however, shows how this friction can lead to very slow population adjustments.

9The city has actually paid to destroy vacant housing, since many argue that it increases crime and poses a danger to public safety (e.g. Kurth and MacDonald (2015)). This destruction has left much of the city composed of green spaces, with occasional single family homes placed in oddly compact lots.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section one provides some background on the data and examines the relationship between population growth and residents’ local ties, which motivate the following sections. Section two presents reduced form regressions that measure how areas with different levels of local ties respond to labor demand shocks. Section three presents a model that incorporates local ties into spatial equilibrium and that allows them to endogenously change over time. Section four presents sufficient statistics analysis that links migration and welfare in a wide class of models of spatial equilibrium.

1 How local ties vary across areas

This section establishes two, perhaps under appreciated, stylized facts. The first is that areas have residents with very different levels of local ties. The second is that these local ties are primarily due to different levels of population growth, since areas grow by attracting people with weaker local ties. In later sections, I show how these differences are empirically important, and I introduce a model to trace out their implications over the long term.

Figure 1: Population changes in two commuting zones

To show how these differences can play out in specific cases, Figure 1 shows population changes in two fairly typical commuting zones – Minneapolis and Atlanta. In 1970, each had a similar population, but since 1980 Atlanta has grown much faster, and it is now almost 50 percent larger. Initially, the share of people who were born locally (in the same state) was about the same across

Notes: Data are from the long form decennial census and the ACS 3 year estimates (2006-2008) and are weighted to be nationally representative. Minneapolis-St.Paul and Atlanta are 1990 commuting zones 21501 and 9100. Locals are people who are born in the state they are living in (Minnesota or Georgia), while outsiders are born in other states or countries.
areas, roughly two thirds. Since 1980, however, people born outside of Georgia have increasingly moved to Atlanta. In 2008, less than half of Atlanta’s population was born in Georgia, while Minneapolis still contains mostly people who were born in Minnesota. Presumably, differences in people’s origins have had important cultural and economic effects on the two cities.

The rest of this section shows how these patterns apply to places besides just Atlanta and Minneapolis. First, I briefly describe the data that I use in this and in following sections. Then I show how changes in the number of people born in an area are much slower than changes in the number of outsiders. Since growth happens by outsiders moving in, growing places have many more people who were born outside the local area. This is intuitive and unsurprising, except for the magnitude of the effect. There are large differences across areas in the proportion of people who were born in the same state and in the average time a householder has lived in his house. In later sections, I show how these fairly striking differences translate into differences in how local economies respond to both policies and local shocks.

Data

Data come, predominantly, from the decennial census and ACS (via Ruggles et al. (2010)). In addition to the ACS, I use a measure of the impacts of international trade on local labor markets, coming from Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), and the NBER vital statistics database. In the remainder of this section, I briefly lay out my justification for using census data, I describe the unit of analysis, and give a brief description of how I processed the data. The data and processing are more fully described in Appendix A.

I use data from the US Census because they provide information about migration, labor supply, wages, and housing rents for a large sample in each year. From 1980 through 2000, I use 5 percent samples of the population, and for the American Community Survey I use 2006-2008 (three year) estimates that include roughly 1 percent of the population in each year. Large sample sizes are important for measuring outcomes accurately in small areas. Nonetheless, my preferred specifications are weighted by initial population to place more emphasis on larger commuting zones where things are more precisely measured (as in Bound and Holzer (2000)). The use of the census means that adjustments occur over a minimum of approximately 10 years (8 years for 2000-2008), matching my focus on longer term processes.

The geographic entity that I use as a unit of observation is a 1990 Commuting Zone, as described in Tolbert and Sizer (1996). Using a procedure developed by David Dorn (Autor and Dorn (2013)), I map publicly available geographic identifiers for each year in the IPUMS to the geographic boundaries of Commuting Zones (CZs). CZs are desirable here because they encompass places where people both live and work, according to 1990 commuting data, and because they cover the entire United States. I restrict to CZs in the continental United States for comparability with prior studies and because migration processes are more comparable within the continental US.

10Throughout this paper I use commuting zones, as defined by Tolbert and Sizer (1996), as my unit of observation. These are described in the following subsection and Appendix A.
I use a person’s place of birth as my primary measure of their local ties. In the data, respondents are asked to report their state of birth (or country, if they were born outside the US), which is the measure that I use. The coarseness of this measure, relative to my unit of observation, does not appear to be a big concern. Other studies have found that people value living close to their birth places according to different geographies. For example, Diamond (2016) finds that people have attachments to census divisions as well as states, and Bartik (2009) reports similar results for MSAs using the PSID. No matter the geographic detail, a person’s place of birth is still only a proxy for their local ties. Some people quickly moved away from their places of birth, and some did not develop strong connections. Robustness checks, using an alternative measure of local ties, reassuringly give similar results.

I compute statistics at the level of CZs using a sample of adults. My sample includes 22-64 year old adults not living in group quarters (barracks and dorms). In computing wages I exclude unpaid family workers and workers who did not work for pay in the past year. I report prices in 2007 dollars using the PCE deflator, and I weight all wages using labor supply weights. Appendix A provides more details.

**Breaking changes into locals and outsiders**

To show the effects of people’s local ties, I break changes in population into changes in the population of people who were born nearby and the population of people who were born elsewhere, including people born in other states and countries. The population of outsiders increases by more than the population of people born locally in places that are growing. Very few areas are actually losing people; some areas appear to be unappealing to outsiders, however, which leads their populations to stagnate.

To compare the importance of outsiders moving in against locals staying, or additional children being born, Figure 2 plots the changes in total population and changes in the population born somewhere else, each expressed as a percentage of the initial population. Each variable covers the period from 1980 to 2008, and the graph includes commuting zones in the continental US. The graph shows how much of the increase in population (on the x axis) is due to increases in outsiders moving in (on the y axis). Mechanically, if the only reason population changes was because more people were born, then each dot would be on the light grey line on the x axis, and all of the population change would be due to changes in outsiders moving in. Conversely, if there was no variation in locals staying, then all changes in population would be due to outsiders, and each dot would be on the light grey 45 degree line. If the two contributed equally then points would be centered on the middle (22.5 degree) light grey line.

Figure 2 shows that outsiders drive population changes in many different areas. Dots on the graph are much closer to the 45 degree line; most are above the middle line. According to a regression with population weights, the slope is 0.74, which implies that any increase in population will be accompanied by an increase in the number of migrants equal to about three quarters of that amount. The unweighted number is lower, but still well above one half. The dots, additionally, are
Figure 2: Changes in population due to outsiders moving in

Notes: Plotted are the percentage change in population from 1980 to 2008 (x-axis), and the change in the number of people in the commuting zone who live outside their state of birth as a percentage of the total population (y-axis). Data are from the 1980 decennial census and the ACS 3 year estimates (2006-2008) and are weighted to be nationally representative. The unit of observation is a commuting zone within the continental United States. To make the figure easier to read, it does not include a small number of commuting zones where the total change in population was over 200 percent. The reported coefficients include them, however, with robust standard errors in parenthesis.

within a relatively narrow cone, suggesting that there is a stable relationship between the changes in the number of outsiders and the number of locals. Outsiders, taken as a whole, appear to be more responsive to changes in local economies.

The importance of outsiders in population changes is important in two ways. First, it suggests that areas have much different levels of outsiders, a fact that I establish in the remainder of this section. Second and more importantly, it suggests that the preferences of outsiders, or people choosing to live in locations that are unfamiliar to them, drive spatial equilibrium. This distinction will be an important element of my modeling strategy, which I lay out in Section 3.

Connecting population growth and local ties

There are substantial differences both in the percentage of residents who were born near where they currently reside and the amount of time that people have spent in their houses, which suggests that local ties vary quite substantially across the United States. These differences in residents’ experience in an area are the result of the large and persistent differences in population growth rates across the United States that have been documented by Blanchard and Katz (1992), among others. Areas grow by attracting outsiders, so growing areas have many outsiders. Declining areas retain a similar percentage of local children, regardless of local conditions. In some areas, fewer than 20 percent of
residents were born in the same state, while more than 80 percent of residents were in others.

Figure 3: Population changes and measures of local ties

Panel A: Percent born locally

Panel B: Avg time living in house

Notes: Data are from the 1980 census and 2006-2008 ACS. Each circle is a commuting zone and its radius is proportional to its population in 1980. The line is a weighted least squares regression, using the population weight. The standard error is clustered by state (a CZ is in a state if the plurality of its population resides there). Share variables are multiplied by 100. The figures omit the few commuting zones that grew more than 200 percent over the period, for visual clarity. These commuting zones are included in the regressions in table 1.

Figure 3 shows the empirical relationship between net changes in population from 1980 to 2008 and the amount of experience residents have in the areas where they live, as of 2008. Panel A shows population growth on the horizontal axis and the percent of residents who were born in the state where they currently live on the vertical axis. There is a robust negative relationship between the two. On average, in a commuting zone whose population increased 100 percent between 1980 to 2008, about 30 percent less of the population will have been born in the same state. The scale of the differences are quite large. Several commuting zones have doubled in size, or more. Fast growing areas have less than a quarter of their populations born in the same state. Most commuting zones, though, have similar populations to 1980 and have more than half of their populations born in the same state. Panel B shows a similar trend for the amount of time people have lived in their houses.\textsuperscript{11} Since the majority of moves are local, this statistic shows some supporting evidence that people in growing areas have lived in the same neighborhoods, in addition to the same areas, for less time. In a commuting zone that has grown by 100 percent more, people have lived in their houses for about 3 fewer years.

Table 1 shows that these relationships are robust to omitting weights and including controls. According to each specification, areas that have grown more contain residents with less experience in the area. The magnitude of the main effects are somewhat smaller than in the figure, but they are still quite meaningful. Areas whose population have doubled have 20 percent fewer locals, as a proportion of their population, and have people who have lived in their houses for approximately

\textsuperscript{11}This statistic comes from the census question asking how long the “householder,” in whose name the residence is owned/rented, has been living at the residence. The statistic reports this number for all people 16-65, using person weights, so it does not necessarily reflect how long the specific individual has lived at that address.
2 years less (the last columns are scaled by 100 for readability). Since population growth is quite persistent, it is difficult to disentangle if the effects are due to more or less recent population growth, but separating out growth in different time periods suggests that there is a relationship even with growth over longer time frames. For example, growth from 1980 to 1990 appears to have an effect that is stronger than growth from 2000 to 2008, at least in terms of point estimates. The (adjusted) coefficients are not different in terms of statistical significance, however.

Figure 4: Percent of residents born in the same state

A map of the percentage of residents born in the same state, shown in Figure 4, shows interesting geographic patterns. Broadly, the share of people born in the same state is much smaller in the West, particularly the Southwest. This is despite western states having higher populations and larger geographic areas. Areas with the highest percentage of residents born in the same state tend to be rural, and they are concentrated in the Deep South, Appalachia, the Upper Midwest, and the Rust Belt. The map’s scale shows, once again, that the differences are quite large. For example, parts of Michigan, Louisiana, and other states have more than 80 percent of their populations born in the same state.\(^\text{12}\) In other areas, including commuting zones surrounding Denver, Colorado and Phoenix, Arizona, fewer than a quarter of residents were born in the state where they live. Appendix Figure A5 shows a similar pattern for the amount of time people have spent in their residences.

\(^\text{12}\)This includes the Isle de Jean Charles in Louisiana, which is notable for a $48 million (Jackson (2016), 2016 dollars) grant to resettle approximately 65 residents. A 2012 movie, Beasts of the Southern Wild, was filmed nearby (Arons (2012)) and set in a similar community. It depicts a forced migration of residents from a fictional island, presumably in southern Louisiana. The movie, and presumably the experiences of the residents involved, present an argument about the importance of residents’ local ties for their migration decisions.
Table 1: Population changes and measures of local ties

<table>
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<th>Percent of CZ born in same state</th>
<th>Average years living in same house</th>
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</table>

Notes: Data are from the decennial census and ACS and cover the continental United States. Regressions are weighted by initial population and standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state (a CZ is in a state if the plurality of its population resides there). All share variables are multiplied by 100 to make them into percentage points. Controls, measured in 1980, are share college educated, share employed, share foreign born, share born in Mexico, and log population.
2 Reduced form results

To test if local ties influence outcomes in spatial equilibrium, this section examines the impact of changes in labor demand in areas with different levels of local ties using a series of reduced form regressions. I quantify impacts by decomposing the demand shift into impacts on population, residents’ labor supply, wages, and rents. I use two plausibly exogenous shift-share instruments to isolate impacts on labor demand. The first, developed by Bartik (1991), uses changes in total industry employment at the national level during the 1980s. The second, developed by Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), uses changes in industry level demand for final goods due to increased trade with China in the 1990s and early 2000s.

The results suggest that areas with different levels of local ties adjusted to labor demand shocks over different margins. Areas with lower levels of local ties adjusted their populations, in keeping with standard models of spatial equilibrium. Areas with higher levels of local ties, however, adjusted the size of their labor force, their wages, and their unemployment rates, as would be expected if people had limited geographic mobility. Rents changed by similar amounts in each area, so the differences are not driven by much larger changes in rents in declining areas.

Outcomes

To understand how areas adjust to labor demand shocks, I decompose the impacts of labor demand shocks between prices and labor supply.\textsuperscript{13} This allows me to distinguish between population reallocation, the standard mechanism in Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) style models, and other possible adjustments, including people moving out of the labor force and wage changes. To compare the importance of each, I scale changes in different labor supply margins so that each represents percent changes in the number of employed workers. To illustrate, the number of people outside the labor force is about six times as large as the number of people who are unemployed. This means that if one percent of people outside the labor force started to work, and the number of jobs was constant, then the number of unemployed people would have to increase by about six percent.

Figure 5 illustrates the effects of a labor demand shock on employment and wages.\textsuperscript{14} Initially, the local labor market is at equilibrium at point A, the intersection of the initial labor demand curve, $L_{D1}$, and the labor supply curve, incorporating all margins of adjustment, $L_S$. A labor demand shock of size A-B affects the local labor market, however, and shifts labor demand to $L_{D2}$. This leads to an increase in wages and employment at the new equilibrium, point F at the intersection of $L_S$ and $L_{D2}$. The size of the wage increase, from A to D, will depend on both the

\textsuperscript{13}For these regressions, and throughout the paper, I do not distinguish between increases and decreases in any of my outcomes. This is because the reallocations that I study involve large gross flows of people into and out of employment, unemployment, the labor force, and specific local areas. So, even if moving into and out of areas involves separate concerns, and most residents are reluctant to move, there will still be no discontinuity as the net flow of population becomes negative. This is a well known fact about employment dynamics, and Monras (2015) documents this fact for migration, noting that most population changes are driven by the behavior of people moving in, while a roughly constant proportion of people move out. Responses in the model, which are continuous but vary depending on the net migration of people from their homes, illustrate this dynamic.
elasticity of labor demand and labor supply, coming from all margins. So, for a constant labor demand elasticity, an area with a more elastic supply of labor will have a smaller increase in wages. This smaller increase in wages is because employment can change by more in places where labor supply is more elastic.

In addition to effects solely on employment and wages, Figure 5 also separates out the equilibrium change due to migration. The curve $L_{SMig}$ illustrates changes in employment, around the initial equilibrium at point A, due to people moving in and out, while the horizontal distance from between $L_{SMig}$ and $L_S$ shows adjustments in all other margins. The equilibrium size of the migration adjustment, in terms of employment, is the horizontal distance from D to E in the diagram, since this is the change in employment due to the migration response after the equilibrium change in wages. So, by seeing how big the distance from D to E is relative to the total change in employment, D to F, it is possible to decompose the importance of migration, labor force participation, and possibly other distinct processes that will adjust the labor supply.

Formally, if we assume a constant elasticity of labor demand ($\eta_D$), labor supply due to migration ($\eta_{SMig}$), and labor supply due to other adjustments ($\eta_{SOther}$), then the size of the equilibrium changes will be simple functions of the three elasticities and the size of the labor demand shock, $B - A$. The change in wages ($F - C$), will be $\frac{B - A}{\eta_D + \eta_{SMig} + \eta_{SOther}}$, while the change due to migration ($E - F$) will be $\eta_{SMig} \frac{B - A}{\eta_D + \eta_{SMig} + \eta_{SOther}}$ and the total change in employment ($F - D$) will be $(\eta_{SMig} + \eta_{SOther}) \frac{B - A}{\eta_D + \eta_{SMig} + \eta_{SOther}}$. If changes in employment due to population are large relative to total changes in employment, then migration is more elastic in particular areas. This result applies regardless of the size of the labor demand shock, or the labor demand elasticity.

To measure the size of changes in employment due to migration, labor force participation and

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14 For conceptual clarity, I am omitting effects on rents. Including rents would complicate the analysis, but should deliver a similar intuition.
unemployment, I log linearize the accounting identity that the number of employees in a place is equal to the population, minus the number of people not in the labor force and the number of people who are unemployed. This allows me to compare changes in population (mainly due to migration), changes in labor force participation, and changes in unemployment rates in terms of their effect on total employment.

\[
E = P - \text{NILF} - U \\
\Delta E = s_p \Delta p - (s_n \Delta n + s_u \Delta u)
\]

I include estimates of the effect of labor demand shocks on employment due to changes in population (Pop), the people not in the labor force (NILF), unemployment, and three other outcomes. The first is the effect on wages, which decreases with more elastic labor supply and labor demand. The second is the effect on local rents. Rents play an important role in the Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) analysis of spatial equilibrium and in the model that I present later. One concern is that some areas will be unable to build housing to accommodate additional population, so rents will rise and lower changes in population. I show rents as a rough gauge of how much changes in housing prices might affect the equilibrium. Third, as an additional measure of the size of the labor force participation response, I include the labor force participation ratio, entered as a percentage. Unlike the other measure of labor force participation (NILF, which is the scaled log change in people outside the labor force) the labor force participation rate controls for total population in the denominator, so it will not mechanically decrease if people move to the area.

Shifters

I use two separate shift share instruments to isolate plausibly exogenous labor demand shocks. Each works on the assumption that changes at the national level will affect a CZ proportionate to its pre-existing industrial structure, measured by its employment shares in particular industries at the beginning of the period. The idea is that whatever drives the national changes is presumably not due to supply factors within the CZs that are affected. The first, Bartik (1991), instrument is perhaps the most straightforward in that it simply takes changes in industrial employment at the national level (excluding the CZ in my case) and projects them onto CZs. The second, Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), instrument isolates the effects of Chinese manufacturing competition.

Bartik instrument

The commonly used Bartik (1991) instrument projects industry level employment changes outside of a CZ onto it using the CZ’s share of employment in each industry at the beginning of the period.

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\[15\] In my specifications I do not attempt to compute real wages. Instead I present separate results for nominal wages and rents (for housing). These could be combined to compute a proxy; Albouy (2016) suggests that local rents can proxy for 1/2 of local consumption, while national accounts suggest that about 1/3 of consumption is spent on housing and utilities.
For area $j$ from period $t-1$ to $t$ the instrument can be written as follows:

$$\Delta L_{j,t} = \sum_{i \in \text{ind}} \left( \frac{L_{i,-j,t} - L_{i,-j,t-1}}{L_{i,-j,t-1}} \right) \frac{L_{i,j,t-1}}{L_{j,t-1}}$$

The instrument computes the average of changes in industry level employment outside the CZ (the term in brackets), weighted by the area’s share of employment (the second term) in period $t-1$.  

The Bartik instrument is a good choice in that it has enough variation to ensure some power, and in that it also can be thought of as plausibly exogenous. To make the case for exogeneity stronger, I only use the instrument in the 1980s because the instrument’s logic of projecting industry level trends onto local areas is particularly compelling in the 1980s. Many of the changes in the 1980s are due to national changes that led to a decline in manufacturing employment. The instrument has a good amount of power since manufacturing tends to be spatially concentrated. At the same time, few industries are so concentrated that a single CZ makes up an excessively large proportion of total employment. I rely on the more specific trade shifter that I describe below to provide some evidence from later periods.

**Trade instrument**

The trade instrument uses a similar shift share strategy, but focuses on a very specific process – increased competition with Chinese manufacturers. Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) document that imports from China to the United States increased significantly over the 1990s and early 2000s as China entered the World Trade Organization and emphasized an export-led development strategy.

$$\Delta L_{j,t} = \sum_{i \in \text{ind}} \frac{-\Delta M_{i,t}}{L_{i,t-1}} \frac{L_{i,j,t-1}}{L_{j,t-1}}$$

Again, the equation computes a weighted average using an area’s share of employment in a particular industry \(\left( \frac{L_{i,j,t-1}}{L_{j,t-1}} \right)\) as weights. In this case, however, the quantity in the parentheses is different. Instead I measure the size of Chinese import competition in a particular industry, modified by a negative sign to make it have the same sign as above. Specifically, \(\Delta M_{i,t}\) measures the dollar value increase in imports coming from China in industry \(i\) in thousands of dollars. The results of this instrument, then, can be interpreted as the effect of an increase in imports from China equal to one thousand dollars per worker.  

The exclusion restriction for this instrument is more credible than a Bartik specification since

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16 Bartik (1991), Blanchard and Katz (1992), and Bound and Holzer (2000) include changes in employment within the region in question in their calculation of industry wide changes in national employment, which simplifies the calculation of the instruments. I follow more recent papers, however, and calculate “leave one out” Bartik instruments by excluding each local labor market in question from the nationwide changes used to project employment changes in each industry.

17 Autor and Dorn (2013) present their regressors using different notation and with a different ordering of terms. For this exercise I use the variables from their published dataset, so I am mechanically using the same variation. I differ from their notation and ordering for presentational reasons, to maintain continuity with the Bartik formula.
it isolates changes due to a single change that was driven by factors outside the United States. Businesses in China increased exports to the US for reasons that are likely to be unrelated to supply shifts in parts of the US. To bolster the case even further, I follow Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) in instrumenting for Chinese import penetration in the US using Chinese import penetration in other countries.

**Specification**

I examine differences in responses to labor demand shocks using two different specifications. I estimate each at the CZ level, removing time invariant characteristics of CZs by first differencing all variables. The bins specification separates CZs into two bins, those with low and high levels of local ties, and estimates effects for each bin. This is my preferred specification, since it allows an easy interpretation of the magnitudes involved. To allow for more straightforward hypothesis testing and to show that the effect is not dependent on the cutoff between two bins, however, I also present a triple differences specification. The triple difference specification allows the impact on individual CZs to vary linearly, but continuously, with differences in the CZ’s local ties.

**Bins**

My preferred specification estimates the effect of labor demand shocks separately for areas with high and low levels of local ties by separating them into two bins. The first bin contains labor markets where less than 60 percent of workers were born in the same state ($1_L = 1$), and the second contains areas where more than 60 percent of workers were born locally ($1_H = 1$). Roughly 10 year changes in the outcomes are linear functions of these shifters and an extensive series of controls:

$$\Delta y_{j,t} = \alpha_t + (\beta_L 1_L + \beta_H 1_H) \Delta \hat{L}_{j,t} + \gamma_L 1_L + \gamma_H 1_H + \gamma_X X_{j,t-1} + \epsilon_{j,t}$$

Here $\Delta \hat{L}_{j,t}$ is the labor demand instrument and the $\beta$ coefficients show the effect of these shocks for the specified subset of local labor markets. In addition, $\alpha_t$ is a dummy for the time period where the regressions encompass multiple time periods, and $X$ are the controls. I follow much of the literature by estimating this equation in first differences, which controls for time invariant effects. In the cases with only two periods, this is exactly equivalent to using fixed effects, but in cases with more than two periods, it relies on slightly different assumptions. In this and the triple difference specification, I report standard errors that are clustered by the state the CZ had the plurality of

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18 I chose 60 percent because it creates roughly two equal sized groups in most years. Earlier versions used 50 percent and the second specification does not rely on a specific cutoff. The cutoff is mainly designed to produce precise coefficient estimates.
its population within.

**Triple difference**

To allow for more straightforward hypothesis testing and to show that the results are robust to different cutoffs, I also use a triple difference specification. The triple difference specification implies that the effect of the labor demand shock varies linearly with the share born locally:

$$\Delta y_{j,t} = \alpha_t + \beta_{\text{Main}} \Delta \hat{L}_{j,t} + \beta_{\text{Inter}} \Delta \tilde{L}_{j,t} \text{ShLocal} + \gamma \text{ShLocal}^2 \text{ShLocal} + \gamma X_{j,t-1} + \epsilon_{j,t} \quad (2)$$

I regress an outcome ($\Delta y_{j,t}$) on a labor demand shifter ($\Delta \hat{L}_{j,t}$) multiplied by the de-meaned share of local workers ($\text{ShLocal}$, which measures average levels of local ties), the direct effect of both, and controls for the time period $\alpha_t$, if there are multiple time periods. The coefficient of interest is $\beta_{\text{Inter}}$, which represents how the effect varies with changes in residents’ average level of local ties. In this framework, tests that effects vary across areas are tests that $\beta_{\text{Inter}}$ is different from zero. Since the share of workers born locally is de-meaned, the coefficient on the labor demand shifter ($\beta_{\text{Main}}$) represents the effect for an area with an average share of workers born locally.

**Results**

**Summary statistics**

To show some basic characteristics of the sample, Table 2 reports summary statistics for the major outcomes, some covariates that I use as controls, and the plausibly exogenous labor demand shocks. Panel A reports statistics about the levels of variables among all 722 continental CZs in 1980, while Panel B shows outcomes and labor demand shocks in the form they enter the regression equations. First I show the scaling factor (if applicable) and the mean and standard deviation among all CZs (unweighted). Next, I show the mean broken out by areas with high and low levels of local ties. Unless otherwise noted, the statistics are computed either in 1980 or from 1980 to 1990 for the scaled log changes.

The first two columns of Panel A show that the average CZ has a modest population, most people 22-65 are employed, and that most people were born in the same place. The average unweighted population of a continental CZ was 162 thousand people in the sample, but the standard deviation is quite large, in accordance with Zipf’s law. Most people are employed, but about 30 percent of adults 22-64 were outside of the labor force. The average CZ had about 66 percent of its residents living in the state of their birth as of 1980 but the standard deviation of this number was relatively large, in keeping with the previous discussion.

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19 In addition to dummy variables for each bin of local labor markets, I control for the share of working age adults outside the labor force, unemployed, foreign born, having entered the state in the past five years, and the share of adults who are under 35 and 50 to 64. Generally, specifications are not sensitive to the choice of controls.

20 Wooldridge (2002) notes that first differencing is preferred when the outcome is a random walk, while fixed effects is preferred when the outcome has serially uncorrelated errors.
Table 2: Summary statistics

Panel A: Levels of covariates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>StD</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>High</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population (thous)</td>
<td>162.2</td>
<td>453.9</td>
<td>282.6</td>
<td>117.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILF (thous)</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>116.3</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed (thous)</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>18.9</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real wages (hourly)</td>
<td>15.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>14.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real rents (monthly)</td>
<td>475.8</td>
<td>77.5</td>
<td>539.5</td>
<td>452.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct in labor force</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>71.2</td>
<td>71.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent locals</td>
<td>66.4</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average time in house</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent college edu</td>
<td>33.5</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>40.5</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent foreign born</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent under 35</td>
<td>42.7</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>41.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent over 50</td>
<td>27.1</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td>27.7</td>
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</table>

Panel B: Outcomes and regressors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Scaling</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>StD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>8.11</td>
<td>18.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NILF</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-5.86</td>
<td>5.92</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real wages</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>-2.84</td>
<td>6.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Real rents</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>7.36</td>
<td>11.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct in labor force</td>
<td></td>
<td>5.13</td>
<td>1.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartik shock (80-90)</td>
<td></td>
<td>12.94</td>
<td>4.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade shock (90-00)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-1.18</td>
<td>1.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade shock (00-08)</td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.64</td>
<td>3.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: The tables show unweighted summary statistics for the sample of 722 continental CZs. Unless otherwise specified, the statistics refer to values in 1980. The first columns show the mean and standard deviation among all CZs, the next two show means for areas with low and high ties (above or below 60 percent locals), and the final three show the scaling parameter and the scaled log change in the variable, except for the percent in the labor force where the value is simply the percent change. Note that the shock variables are themselves scaled log changes, but these statistics appear in the first columns instead. The variables are grouped into outcomes, controls, and regressors that are used in the reduced form regressions.
Areas with different levels of local ties also differ in terms of other covariates. Panel A shows that CZs high ties tend to be smaller, in keeping with the relationship between population stagnation and higher levels of local ties. CZs with high ties tend to have slightly older, less educated populations who earn lower wages and pay less money in rent. Somewhat surprisingly, they also have higher labor force participation. Differences in these covariates suggest that it is important to control for level differences across areas, which the first differences specification does.

Panel B shows that population changes have large impacts on employment, much more so than other categories. The standard deviation of scaled population changes are roughly three times larger than changes in people in the labor force and nine times larger than changes in unemployment. The table also shows the impact of women entering the labor force in greater numbers from 1980 to 1990, since the labor force participation rate grew by five percent on average.

**Bartik instrument**

Table 3: Bartik shocks by share born locally

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>NILF</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Rents</th>
<th>LFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: Bins specification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartik: Low ties</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.33)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bartik: High ties</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-val: No diff</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.93</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>NILF</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Rents</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B: Triple difference specification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
<td>-4.24</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>-3.08</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.98)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>1.24</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent locals</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>-0.23</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.60</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.54</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: OLS regression coefficients, weighted by initial population, are plotted for either the main effect plus a linear interaction term with the demeaned share locally born, or the coefficient separately estimated for less than or greater than 50 percent locally born CZs. Controls, measured in 1980, are: the birth share variable used in the interaction term, the share of working age adults outside the labor force, unemployed, with a college education, foreign born, having entered the state in the past five years, and the share of adults who are under 35 and 50 to 64. Wald tests are presented for the hypothesis that the effect is constant across states with high and low in state birth shares. Data are from the decennial census from 1980 to 1990 including all CZs in the continental US. Variables are in percentage changes, except for the linear interaction terms, which are proportions (divided by 100). Log numbers of people (unemployment, labor force exits, and log population) are scaled by their ratio to the number of employed workers and wages are residualized according to the text. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by state (determined by the state where the plurality of residents live).
Specifications using Bartik instruments from 1980 to 1990, shown in Table 3, show strong migration responses in areas with low levels of local ties, and smaller responses in areas with higher levels of local ties. Differences in the coefficients on population are statistically and economically significant in both specifications, as are differences in the number of people outside the labor force. There is little evidence of differences in other coefficients. Put together, the changes suggest that migration is less responsive to labor demand shocks in places with high local ties, in keeping with the intuition that local ties are a barrier to migration.

The most striking difference in Table 3 is the response of total population in each area. The bins specification for areas with low levels of local ties, shown in Panel A, show that population changes add two percentage points to the stock of potential workers after a one percent increase in predicted local labor demand. Alongside this, however, the number of people outside of the labor force increases by about 0.5 percent of the initial workforce, leaving a 1.5 percentage point increase in employment. For areas with higher levels of local ties, the population response is muted, equal to only about 0.5 percent of the workforce, and there is no discernible change in the number of people outside the labor force. The triple difference specification confirms these results. The interaction term is scaled by 100 for readability, so the roughly 30 percent difference between the average high and low ties area implies a 1.3 percentage point smaller change due to population changes, and a 0.3 percentage point smaller change due to people entering the labor force, in an area with higher ties. The two specifications appear to match quite well, as expected.

Differences between high and low ties areas in Table 3 suggest that adjustments are different in areas where people have strong local ties. The population changes are one quarter as large in areas with stronger ties, and the difference is statistically significant at the one percent level. This suggests that areas with lower ties can adjust after changes in labor demand by absorbing additional population, as in Blanchard and Katz (1992). Areas with higher ties, however, adjust along other margins. In the bins specification, areas with high levels of local ties have a statistically significant increase in labor force participation rates after a positive shock, mirroring Bartik (1993), who finds that residents benefit from local labor demand shocks.21

Differences in age structure, differences in educational attainment, or developments in the housing market do not appear to drive these differences between areas with high and low levels of local ties. Appendix Table A9 includes separate interactions with the local age structure, local educational attainment, the initial percent of residents employed, and several measures of initial rents. It shows that the main results I outlined above are robust to including these, and appear to actually

21One somewhat puzzling result is that an increase in labor demand increases the number of people outside the labor force in areas with low ties. Appendix Tables A6 and A7 separate the effect out for men and women to show that the effect is driven by women. According to Table A7, areas with few locally born workers experience increases in the number of adult women outside of the labor force that are roughly 1/3 the size of the increase in population. This relative size suggests that women migrated in and remained outside of the labor force, likely because of their partner. This supports a literature on “tied migration,” including Sandell (1977) and McKinnish (2008), that finds that women often drop out of the labor force after moves. The 1/3 figure is also consistent with average labor force participation rates among women in the 1980s, which are between 50 and 60 percent. Impacts on the labor force participation rates, which control for changes in population due to migration, are never significantly negative in Tables 3, A6, and A7.
grow if other interactions are included. Another piece of evidence that suggests that these effects are driven by local ties themselves is the near equal sized impacts on wages and rents. If, for example, differences between growing and declining areas were due to housing being inelastically supplied in declining areas because housing is durable, then rents should increase by much more in areas with higher levels of ties.\textsuperscript{22} While the estimates for wages and rents in Table 3 are imprecise, there is little evidence that these differences are very large in this context, at least.

**Trade instrument**

Regressions using the trade instruments, shown in Table 4, also show that areas with low ties adjust in terms of population, while places with higher ties adjust along other margins. The bins specification shows that a $1,000 per worker decrease in import competition from Chinese firms leads to an increase in population equal to 1 percent of the initial workforce.\textsuperscript{23} The number of workers outside the labor force increases by about one quarter as much, but this difference is statistically indistinguishable from zero. The effect on labor force participation, which controls for population, is a fairly precise zero. Interestingly, wages appear to be barely affected, but rents jump substantially. In places with high levels of local ties, however, people enter the labor force. Population changes are negative, though small and statistically insignificant, and the stock of workers outside the labor force decreases by about 1 percent of the initial workforce. Changes in the number of unemployed workers are also meaningful, at 0.2 percent of the workforce, particularly if one considers that the value is scaled. Putting these together, the effect on the labor force participation ratio are substantial. The $1,000 decrease in competition leads to a roughly 0.75 increase in the percent of workers in the labor force. In addition, wages increase substantially in places with high local ties – by 0.8 percent in response to the $1,000 per worker decrease in competition.

The results in Table 4 are robust to using the triple difference specification and the magnitudes of each are also in line with the bins specification. The estimated interaction terms are negative for population, the number of people outside the labor force, and unemployment, though the interaction with population is imprecisely estimated and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Effects on wages and labor force participation increase with higher ties, in keeping with the limited population

\textsuperscript{22}Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Notowidigdo (2011) emphasize the importance of durable housing in declining areas. Durable housing can lead to an inelastic housing supply in areas where population is declining. Since houses depreciate slowly, decreases in labor demand (and amenities) can lead to very low rents, which keep people in the area. This is particularly true for poorer residents, since poor people spend a higher share of their incomes on housing. This mechanism is most important over short time frames and fine geographies, however. Over longer time frames, like the time frames associated with changes in residents’ local ties, even small depreciation rates can lead to substantial decreases in the housing stock. Another factor to consider is that the size of households has been declining (Albouy and Zabek (2016)) so housing stocks would have to expand to house a population that remained constant (few areas have consistently declined in population). Previous examinations by Rappaport (2004) and Davis, Fisher and Veracierto (2013) have also found that durable housing plays a modest role.

\textsuperscript{23}Since the median exposure to Chinese import competition is roughly $1,000 per worker, the coefficients show the effect in terms of the exposure of a fairly typical area. The mean, shown in Table 2, is higher because the measure is particularly large in some rural areas. It is more than $15,000 per worker in some areas and maxes out at $43,000 per worker in Murray, Kentucky. The results are weighted by population and are robust to dropping several of these areas.
Table 4: Import shocks by share born locally

### Panel A: Bins specification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>NILF</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Rents</th>
<th>LFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trade: Low ties</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.74</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.52)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade: High ties</td>
<td>-0.13</td>
<td>-1.10</td>
<td>-0.20</td>
<td>1.20</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.57)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P-val: No diff</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.78</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.62</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Panel B: Triple difference specification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>NILF</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Rents</th>
<th>LFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Interaction</td>
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<td>-3.84</td>
<td>-0.70</td>
<td>2.64</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>-0.79</td>
<td>2.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(1.87)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(2.20)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main effect</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>-0.34</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.33</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.40)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent locals</td>
<td>-0.39</td>
<td>-0.21</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Two stage least squares estimates using Chinese trade with other countries in each industry to instrument for trade with the US only. Coefficients are plotted for either the main effect plus a linear interaction term with the demeaned share locally born, or the coefficient separately estimated for less than or greater than 50 percent locally born CZs. Controls, measured in the beginning of each period, are: the birth share variable used in the interaction term, the share of working age adults outside the labor force, unemployed, foreign born, having entered the state in the past five years, the share of working age adults outside the labor force, unemployment, labor force exits, and log population) are scaled by their ratio to the number of employed workers, and wages are residualized according to the text. Standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by state (determined by the plurality of the population is in that state) and all results are weighted by population.
response. Each suggests substantial losses for the local population as Chinese firms entered the market in the 1990s and early 2000s, keeping with Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) and Feler and Senses (2015). Interestingly, these losses appear to be highly concentrated in areas where workers have higher levels of local ties and were either unwilling or unable to migrate.

The findings are also robust to including other possible differences as interactions; if anything, they appear to be strengthened by them. Appendix Table A10 shows that including the same interactions with age structure, educational attainment, the percent employed, and several measures of rents does not change the main findings. The results are often stronger with additional interactions. The estimated impacts on rents are also quite similar, which suggests that the housing markets in each area respond in similar ways.

Summary

Areas where people have higher levels of ties respond to labor demand shocks in different ways. In areas where people have higher levels of ties, population changes are smaller, people move into or out of the labor force, and wages change by more. All of these suggest that there are forces that make migration slower in places where people have higher ties, and that these have implications for welfare. To see how these differences can emerge in spatial equilibrium, the next section presents a model that incorporates a flexible specification of people’s ties to their homes. It shows how declining areas are unappealing to most people born outside, but still are appealing to a considerable fraction of people who have strong local ties. Thus, high average levels of local ties emerge endogenously. I use the model, and generalize it using a sufficient statistics approach, to examine the welfare implications of different migration elasticities. I also use the model’s structure, combined with these estimates, to calculate migration elasticities after Bartik shocks in the 1980s and increases in Chinese trade in the 1990s and early 2000s.

3 Model

A parametric model formalizes and extends the intuitions laid out above. It specifies how areas develop different levels of local ties, how different levels of local ties lead to different migration elasticities, and how local ties may be reallocated over time. The model also allows me to distinguish between equilibrium in the steady state and in the short and medium run. Previous shocks have

\[ 24 \text{This appears to be true in terms of population increases and decreases, since the specifications do not distinguish between these two margins.} \]

\[ 25 \text{It would be difficult to credibly identify asymmetric effects in this context, since my} \]

\[ 26 \text{instruments are not the only factors leading to population growth and decline. For example, a positive shock to labor} \]

\[ 27 \text{demand might be in a place that is shrinking. Also, in the data, gross flows of people into and out of CZs appear} \]

\[ 28 \text{to be much larger than net flows, and people are still moving to places that are declining. This implies that there is} \]

\[ 29 \text{not a discontinuous change in the profile of the marginal migrant as population changes turn negative. In my model,} \]

\[ 30 \text{presented in Section 3, effects of labor demand shocks are actually symmetric locally. This is because people born in} \]

\[ 31 \text{an area might reside elsewhere, but wish to return. In declining areas these “exiles” are a larger proportion of people} \]

\[ 32 \text{who might consider moving in, and the preferences of this group of marginal people changes continuously. Kenman} \]

\[ 33 \text{and Walker (2011) also emphasize that return migration makes up a large percentage of gross migration flows, so this} \]

\[ 34 \text{mechanism is supported by the data.} \]
no relevance for the model’s steady state, since ties are able to be completely reallocated, as with models that do not include local ties. It takes a long time to reach the steady state, however, and ties are extremely relevant in the interim.

In the model, different levels of local ties are a consequence of population growth, and local ties lead to different migration elasticities across areas. In the short run, negatively shocked areas can become unattractive to outsiders, while still retaining workers with local ties. This makes their migration elasticities low; outsiders are reluctant to move in and locals are reluctant to move out.\textsuperscript{25}

Local ties can be reallocated, but the reallocation takes several generations.\textsuperscript{26} People move to areas after favorable shocks, and they have children who become tied to these areas. In this way, children’s local ties reflect these changes in local productivity and amenities. Permanent subsidies are undesirable, since they keep population from being fully reallocated. Subsidies that last for a generation, however, can subsidize areas without affecting migration by very much. Similarly, if changes in amenities or productivity are only temporary, then it may be socially desirable to retain the previous distribution of local ties.

The remainder of this section presents the model, its calibration, and its implications in the short and long run. First, I present the model’s setting, the various agents who interact in the model, the problems agents solve, and the resulting equations that describe the model’s equilibrium. Next, I show how migration elasticities incorporate both the traditional mechanism of rents rising to discourage additional migration, and also local ties affecting migration, through a term connected to how selected the average resident is. This illustrates how local ties form, and how they impact migration elasticities. The following section presents the model’s calibration, using indirect inference and off the shelf parameters. The final two subsections present the short and long run implications of including local ties in the model. The short and long run implications link the model to my reduced form results and provide longer term implications of including local ties in a model of spatial equilibrium.

**Setting, agents, and equilibrium**

The model is in spatial equilibrium, with a large number of areas, indexed by \( j \), that individual workers, indexed by \( i \), are free to move between in each period. Workers have ties to their home areas, indexed by \( k \). I model these ties using a parametric distribution of amenity values that workers enjoy if they live in their homes (where \( j = k \)). Each area also has an amenity value, \( a_j \), that applies to both locals and outsiders. Local firms offer wages, \( w_j \), based on levels of local productivity, and the prices a national firm pays to combine local goods into a tradeable consumption good. Landlords charge rents, \( r_j \), based on the scarcity of land in an area. The

\textsuperscript{25}Since there are always gross flows of locals moving out and outsiders moving in, migration elasticities are symmetric across small positive and negative shocks. So, a small increase and a small decrease in wages and/or amenities will have effects that are approximately equal in magnitude. Population changes have a non-linear relationship with the size of the underlying changes, however. In general, the first half of a decrease in productivity will change population by more than the second half, since the migration elasticity will be smaller for the second half.

\textsuperscript{26}Rappaport (2004) finds that reallocation can occur very slowly in models with relatively small frictions to capital, or labor, reallocation in the form of convex adjustment costs.
interesting counterfactual relates to the impact of government subsidies, $g_j$.

I distinguish between equilibrium in the short and long run. In the short run, people’s local ties are fixed, so population adjustments are limited by people’s local ties. In keeping with my empirical approach, I assume that these are proportional to where people were born, and that the initial distribution of population determines these birth places. In the long run, however, I allow local ties to adjust with population changes, and I show that this leads to a steady state.

**Worker’s problem**

For a worker of type $i$, living in area $j$, and with home area $k$, utility is Cobb-Douglas in a final consumption good $c_j$ (with a price normalized to one) and housing $h_j$.\(^{27}\)

$$u_{ijk} = (1 - \alpha^H) \ln(c_j) + \alpha^H \ln(h_j) + A_j + 1(k = j)\mu_i + \xi_{ij}$$

With a corresponding budget constraint (taking into account government subsidies, $(g_j)$):

$$c_j + r_jh_j = w_j + g_j$$

The $\mu_i$ term is a random coefficient describing a worker’s preference for their home. $\mu_i$ depends on the worker’s unobserved type $i$; it allows me to specify the distribution of preferences for residing in one’s home, or the distribution of people’s local ties. I assume that all areas have the same initial distribution of local ties. A sorting process, similar to the one I document in Section 1, will make it so that some areas will have residents who have stronger local ties, however.\(^{28}\)

The government provides a net subsidy, $g_j$, to workers. People also gain utility from general local amenities $A_j$ and an area specific error term $\xi_{ij}$. Following much of the literature estimating Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) style models, I assume workers inelastically supply one unit of labor once they choose their location.

The above implies a log linear indirect utility function.

$$u_{ijk} = \ln(w_j + g_j) - \alpha^H \ln(r_j) + A_j + \mu_i1(k = j) + \xi_{ij}$$

If $\xi_{ij}$ is distributed type one extreme value, then the likelihood that a person of type $i$, with home $k$, locates in area $j$, which I denote with $\psi_{ijk}$, takes on a very convenient form.

$$\psi_{ijk} = \exp(\omega_{ijk}/\sigma_\xi) / \sum_{j' \in J} \exp(\omega_{ij'k}/\sigma_\xi)$$

where $\omega_{ijk}$ is the worker’s utility in area $j$, excluding $\xi_{ij}$, and the $\sigma_\xi$ term is a measure of the variance of $\xi_{ij}$.

\(^{27}\)I have omitted time subscripts for parsimony, because the problem is static once one considers workers’ local ties.

\(^{28}\)Details of my empirical implementation of the $\mu_i$ term are provided in the calibration section. I use a normal distribution, with a mean and variance that I calibrate using indirect inference. Train (2009) provides an introduction to logit and mixed logit (random coefficient) models, including details of their development in describing substitution patterns in consumer demand for products.
Local goods firms

Local good varieties for each area are produced by (a representative) perfectly competitive firm in each area, called the local goods producer. The local goods producer combines capital, $K_j$, which is supplied in a national financial market at interest rate $\rho$, with local labor, $N_j$, to produce $Y_j$ of the local good. The production function is parameterized as:

$$Y_j = f(\theta_j, K_j, N_j)$$

$$= \theta_j K_j^{\alpha} N_j^{1-\alpha}$$

$\theta_j$ is a area specific productivity term.

National firm

A perfectly competitive national firm produces the tradeable consumption good out of each local good. It buys each local good at a price of $p_j$, and sells the tradeable good at a price of one.

$$Y = \left( \sum_{j' \in J} \phi_{j'}^Y (Y_{j'}) \frac{\eta Y}{\eta Y - 1} \right)^{\frac{\eta Y}{\eta Y - 1}}$$

Where $j'$ indexes the goods produced in each area, $\eta Y$ is the Armington elasticity (of substitution) between the local goods, and $\phi_j$ is a demand shifter for each local good.

Government

The government can provide subsidies (net of taxes) to workers living in each area, $g_j$. The subsidy represents programs that are either directly or indirectly targeted to certain areas, as well as the taxes that pay for them. The largest subsidies are likely to be due to a lack of adjustments for local prices in both the tax code (Albouy (2016)) and in means based programs (Notowidigdo (2011)). Spending on transportation infrastructure, grants to provide utilities, state and federal grants for education, and explicitly place based policies, like federal neighborhood improvement grants, could also be included in $g_j$. For simplicity, I assume that these programs are valued by residents at the cost it takes to provide them.

Since the government has to balance its budget, the following equation must hold.

$$\sum_j g_j N_j = 0$$

The subsidies are likely the most policy relevant in declining areas. Albouy (2016) notes that progressive tax rates subsidize people living in less productive places, since they do not adjust for local prices. A similar argument applies to other means tested programs. This bias is often by design. For example, the governing documents of the European Union explicitly allow national governments to pursue place based policies to “promote the economic development of areas where the standard of living is abnormally low” (Article 107 of EU (2012)).
Housing market

The housing good $h_j$ in a local area represents both housing and non-tradeable local goods and services. The price of the housing good, $r_j$, is determined by supply and demand in the local area.

Housing is supplied by landlords, assumed to be absentee, who develop plots of land that can be turned into housing at monotonically increasing marginal costs.\(^{30}\) I parameterize these using the following supply function, which gives the cumulative sum of all housing units that would be rented out for rent $r_j$:

$$H_j^S = F(r_j) = r_j^{\eta_H}$$

Where $\eta_H$ is the local housing supply elasticity. The consumer problem implies (suppressing tax terms) that workers will demand housing as a fixed proportion of their income:

$$H_j^D = \alpha w_j N_j r_j$$

Law of motion for local ties

The law of motion for the number of people born in area $k$, specified below, implies that ties are formed proportionate to the population of each area. The first term specifies that a fixed proportion, $s_D$, of the population will die and have their ties reallocated in each period. The additional $s_D$ ties are allocated according to the current population. For area $k$, current population is $\sum_{k'} N_{kk'}$. The $s_D 1 + s_F$ term specifies the $s_D$ ties are reallocated so that there is a constant population where a constant proportion is foreign born.

$$N'_k = N_k (1 - s_D) + \sum_{k'} N_{kk'} \frac{s_D}{1 + s_F}$$

To keep the model simple, I assume that the destruction of local ties is random, and that workers do not have preferences about the distribution of other people’s local ties. $s_D N$ workers die in each period, to be replaced with children who were born according to the distribution of deaths, and of total population. This is very helpful in terms of making the model tractable. Since the deaths are random, there is no impact on the shape of the distribution of $\mu_i$. Since workers do not attempt to influence the distribution of local ties, I can continue to solve the model according to the earlier equations, which are specified conditional on the current distribution of local ties.

While it is a strong assumption, there are reasons to suspect that workers lack strong preferences about the distribution of local ties after $s_D$ has arrived. One way of rationalizing this is to assert that parents act as if their children will have the same preferences that they do, or that their choices

\(^{30}\)Another interpretation of the absentee landlord assumption is that households own their houses but effectively rent their houses to themselves each period. Most notably, this abstracts from the investment motive for owning a home. Zhang (2016) gives some analysis of the investment role of housing, separating it out from consumption choices, to some extent. There is a more applied literature on a specific implication of the financial role of housing – housing lock in. In the appendix, I give a brief overview of the literature on housing lock in.
about where to live have a very small impact on their children’s local ties. Another is to assert that parents think about forming local ties in a way that is myopic, behaving as if either they cannot influence their family’s local ties, or they cannot forecast future conditions well enough to make such a long term decision.

The model will be in a steady state if the following equation is satisfied. Essentially, the number of people who were born in the area is equal to the population over one plus the share of foreign born people in the country.\(^{31}\)

\[
N_k = \frac{\sum_{k'} N_{kk'}}{1 + s_F}
\]

**Equilibrium**

Equilibrium is a set of prices and quantities \((p_j, w_j, r_j, N_j)\) where markets clear, and agents have solved their individual problems. It obeys the following equations:

Labor market supply and demand locally:

\[
N_j = \sum_{j' \in J} \sum_{k' \in K} \psi_{j'k'} N_{j'k'}
\] (4)

\[
w_j = (1 - \alpha^Y)(p_j \theta_j)^{1/(1-\alpha^Y)} \left(\frac{\alpha^Y}{\rho}\right)^{\alpha^Y/(1-\alpha^Y)}
\] (5)

Equilibrium in the housing market and equilibrium in the market for the local good:

\[
r_j = \left[\alpha^H w_j N_j\right]^{1/\eta^H}
\] (6)

\[
\theta_j N_j \left(\frac{p_j \theta_j \alpha^Y}{\rho}\right)^{1/(1-\alpha^Y)} = Y \frac{\phi_j}{p_j^\eta^Y}
\] (7)

**Migration responses**

The migration elasticity, analytically derived from the motel and shown below, reveals the influence of local ties as well as the more typical influences of housing supply in a Rosen-Roback framework.

\[
\frac{d \ln(N_j)}{d \ln(w_j)} = \frac{[1 + \eta^H - \alpha^H]}{1 + \eta^H + \alpha^H(1 - \psi_j)/\sigma_{\xi}} \frac{(1 - \psi_j)}{\sigma_{\xi}}
\] (8)

There are two distinct factors that determine the elasticity: The first term is the traditional Rosen-Roback mechanism of increases in wages causing increases in rents. Rents increase because higher wages lead to higher demand for housing, both from new residents and from current residents who spend some of their increased wages on housing. The second term measures the influence of

\(^{31}\)It is straightforward to show that this steady state is stable and unique.
worker preferences, and it is inversely proportional to residents’ local ties. To see this, strip away
the effects of prices by considering the impact of an increase in log wages, with rents unchanged.

\[ \frac{\partial \ln(N_j)}{\partial \ln(w_j)} = \frac{(1 - \bar{\psi}_j)}{\sigma_\xi} \]  

(9)

The denominator shows a dynamic that is typical in models of spatial equilibrium; migration
elasticities decrease when people have stronger idiosyncratic preferences. The spread of the person
by area is given by \( \sigma_\xi \), so as the spread widens, the migration elasticity decreases.

The numerator shows how local ties influence migration elasticities, since it is a decreasing
function of \( \bar{\psi}_j \). Equation 3 defines \( \bar{\psi}_j \): it is the ratio of \( \omega_{ijk} \) terms in area \( j \) over the sum of \( \omega_{ij'k} \) terms in every area, averaged over all residents of area \( j \). Intuitively \( \bar{\psi}_j \) will be higher if more
residents are inframarginal, or if they greatly prefer area \( j \) over all other areas. This implies that
areas with many locally born residents will have lower migration elasticities, since these residents
tend to have higher values of \( \mu_{ii} \), so they have idiosyncratically high preferences to reside in area \( j \).

I show how this is the case both for the calibrated model and in empirical regressions later in the
paper.\(^{32}\)

Calibration

To calibrate the model I use a mixture of off the shelf parameters as well as an indirect inference
procedure. The most important parameters are the two variance terms for the idiosyncratic error
distributions (\( \mu_i \) and \( \xi \)). These determine how important idiosyncratic factors are in workers
preferences for their birth areas and for other areas. I set the variance of non-local term, \( \xi \), based
on estimates in the literature provided by Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2014). For \( \mu_i \), I use an indirect
inference procedure to match a regression coefficient relating workers’ decisions to stay in the areas
of their birth with the change in log population in that area. This regression is shown in Appendix
Table A4. It is very much related to the estimates in Figure 2, in that it is driven by the relationship
between people staying and outsiders moving in. I set the mean of \( \mu \) so that roughly 60 percent of
workers stay in the area where they are born. This roughly matches the national share of workers
who stay in their state of birth.\(^{33}\)

I implement the indirect inference procedure in two steps. First, I set the share of people who
are foreign born, as well as the spread of \( \xi \). These two parameters, along with the two parameters

\(^{32}\)The functional form of \( \xi_{ijk} \) tends to work against this result. For individuals, the logit error structure implies
that workers with a 50 percent probability of residing in an area (based on observables) will be the most responsive
to changes in real wages. This is at odds with the findings in the first section that workers are unresponsive to
changes in general amenities of their home areas, and that workers have a roughly 50 percent chance of living in their
home state. Since the structure of the logit model seems to make an unrealistic functional form assumption about
individual migration elasticities, it is particularly important that the \( \mu_i \) terms have a distribution of values. If the \( \mu_i \)
terms all had the same value, then this would actually make the migration elasticities of locals higher than those of
outsiders.

\(^{33}\)Empirically I calculate the normal distribution of \( \mu_i \) using Gaussian quadrature with 100 nodes, which provides
a good approximation with moderate computational effort.
defining the distribution of $\mu_i$, are the only parameters in the model that will affect the moments that I target. I set $\sigma_\xi$ to 0.4, which produces average elasticities close to those found by Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2014) and I assume that 13 percent of workers are foreign born, based on current population statistics. The second step is to simulate a series of productivity draws and match the estimated relationship of locals staying and outsiders moving in, shown in Appendix Table A4, as well as approximately 60 percent of workers staying in their homes. Table 5 shows the implied parameters.

I set the other parameters, reported in Table 5, according to national averages and to the literature. Three important parameters are the Armington elasticity ($\eta^Y$), the share of housing/local goods in overall consumption ($\alpha^H$), and the elasticity of supply for housing ($\eta^H$). For $\eta^Y$ I follow Feenstra, Obstfeld and Russ (2014) and choose an Armington elasticity of 4. I set $\alpha^H$ (the share of locally produced / housing goods in consumption) based on Albouy (2016). I set $\eta^H$ to be equal to roughly the middle of the estimates in Green, Malpezzi and Mayo (2005).

For the exercises below, I focus on a situation where all areas are initially the same. I set the location specific terms ($A_j$, $\theta_j$, and $\phi_j$) to be identically equal to one. These represent demand and supply shifters that have impacts on the levels of wages, rents, and amenities but not on responses to them, which are the focus of the exercises below. I set J so that there are 722 areas, which

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**Table 5: Parameter values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Value</th>
<th>Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_\xi$ Preference spread</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mu_{i\mu}$ Preference for home</td>
<td>3.23</td>
<td>Indirect inference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma_{i\mu}$ Preference for home spread</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>Indirect inference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta^Y$ Armington elast</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Feenstra, Obstfeld and Russ (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^Y$ Capital share</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\rho$ Real interest rate</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Standard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta^H$ Housing supply elasticity</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Green, Malpezzi and Mayo (2005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha^H$ Non-tradeable share of cons</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Albouy (2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$J$ Number of areas</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>Number of CZ’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_F$ Share foreign</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>US population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$s_D$ Share dying</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>60 year avg lifespan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These are the parameter values used for the model’s calibration, including a text description and a note describing the reasoning behind each value. Variables noted with “indirect inference” were computed using an indirect inference procedure that seeks to match the share of people who live in their home areas (states in the data) as well as a coefficient of a regression of the proportion of people who stay in their home state on log changes in the population of that state.

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34 Within the model, foreign born workers have $\mu_i = 0$ for all areas, since these workers were not born in any area of the US. The model does not feature migration across international borders, however, so they only choose across local labor markets in the United States. The assumption underlying this choice is that changes in any one individual area will affect the attractiveness of the country as a whole by a very small amount.

35 There is a substantial literature showing that housing supply elasticities vary significantly based on local geography and zoning (Most prominently Saiz (2010) and Glaeser and Gyourko (2002)). A concern with $\eta^H$ is the functional form of the supply curve. Glaeser and Gyourko (2005) and Notowidigdo (2011) argue that this is an important concern, particularly for rapid declines in productivity. Other studies, including Davis, Fisher and Veracierto (2013), find that it plays a limited role. Empirically, I find little evidence that housing supply varies greatly between areas with high and low ties, which supports the idea that local ties are built up over long periods where housing can depreciate more easily.
matches with the number of local labor markets in my data.\textsuperscript{36}

**Mechanisms and dynamics**

This section shows how local ties form, how they impact migration and local wages, and how they can be reallocated over time. Local ties are stronger in areas where productivity has declined, since people with strong local ties are much more willing to endure the low real wages that come with a decline in productivity.\textsuperscript{37} These higher levels of local ties imply that new shocks will have smaller impacts on population, and larger impacts on real wages, than in areas that are growing. People's local ties can be reallocated, but the process can be slow – particularly if it involves new people being born and growing up in different areas.

Local ties change after population changes, so two identical changes in productivity can have different effects if they happen in succession. Figure 6 shows this dynamic for two permanent 50 percent decreases in local productivity ($\theta_j$), which is plotted in Panel A.\textsuperscript{38} The change in productivity decreases both population, plotted in Panel B, and real wages, plotted in Panel C. The size of these drops varies, however; population drops by more initially, and real wages drop by more in the second period. Population drops by .58 log points initially, and .43 log points in the second period (44 and 19 percent). Real wages, however, drop by .19 and .26 log points, or 18 and then 23 percent. The second decrease in productivity affect local real wages by more, because there are fewer people who are willing to adjust to it by moving to other places.

Areas have different responses after successive changes in productivity because each change leads to different types of residents. Growing places attract outsiders because they offer higher real wages. The lower real wages available in declining places mean that their populations have stronger local ties, however, because people will only be willing to locate there if they have local ties that make up for the low real wages.

The inverse relationship between population growth and people’s level of local ties is very apparent in the data, and the model is able to match it quite well. Figure 7 plots how the share of people who were born nearby, my empirical measure of local ties, changes as places have bigger increases in population. It plots both values from the data, where each circle represents a commuting zone, and the implied relationship in the model as the solid line, based on changing levels of productivity in the model. Each relationship has a pronounced negative slope.

These different levels of local ties lead to differences in migration elasticities, so the amount of migration that happens in response to a change in productivity will vary depending on an area’s level of local ties. Figure 8 quantifies this by comparing places with different changes in productivity.

\textsuperscript{36} Albouy (2016) and Diamond (2016) do attempt to allow areas to vary in terms of local productivity and local quality of life, and they present estimates for various areas. I do not attempt this exercise here, however, because it is extremely data intensive and because the focus of this paper is not on estimating the relative merits of various areas, in terms of productivity and amenities. Instead, I use the model as a way of exploring how integrating people’s local ties impacts the dynamics of reaching spatial equilibrium after a series of shocks, in a simple and tractable way.

\textsuperscript{37} A similar dynamic applies to changes in amenities.

\textsuperscript{38} In addition to productivity, $\theta_j$, I also decrease demand for the local good from the national goods firm, given by $\theta_j$. This separates the impact of local ties from the imperfect substitutability of the various local goods.
Figure 6: Effects of two consecutive decreases in productivity

Panel A: Productivity
Panel B: Population
Panel C: Real wages

Note: This plots the how population and wages change after two exogenous shocks to productivity, with each variable measured in log deviations. Each shock decreases productivity by 50 percent.
Figure 7: Share locals and population changes

Note: The black line is model predicted share of local workers after an increase in productivity that generates the population change listed. The circles are individual CZs, based on population changes from 1970 to 2008 and the share of locals in 2008.
Figure 8: Migration elasticities after a shock to local productivity

![Graph showing migration elasticities vs. share of locals]

Note: The y axis represents migration elasticities as derived in equation 8 while the x axis shows the share of locals in total population. Differences in share of locals are the result of exogenous changes in local productivity.

and hence different levels of local ties. Areas that have had increases in productivity, and hence have residents with fewer local ties, have smaller migration elasticities. A place where a bit less than 30 percent of the population was born locally, like Denver, will have a migration elasticity of around 1.8. Conversely, a place where 70 percent of the population was born locally, like Detroit, will have a migration elasticity that is one half as large, at 0.9. Compared to the estimates coming from responses to labor demand shocks, these differences are fairly modest.

Figure 9: Effects of a decrease in productivity over time

![Graphs showing population, real wages, and number of people born over time]

Panel A: Population  Panel B: Real wages  Panel C: People born here

Note: This plots the population, real wages, and the number of people born in an area after a permanent 50 percent decline in productivity. Real wages are the total of the wage, rent, and amenity terms in the utility function and the number of people born in the area is the total number of people whose birth place is the area, $N_k$.

Another departure from more traditional models of spatial equilibrium is that local ties lead to very slow adjustment processes after local shocks, since it can take a long time for local ties to be reallocated. Figure 9 shows an example of a slow adjustment process after a 50 percent permanent decline in productivity. On impact, the drop in productivity leads to a 37 percent
decrease in population and a 13 percent decrease in real wages. The impact is different in the long term, however, once people’s ties are reallocated to other places. Panel C shows how the drop in population leads fewer people to be born in the area over time, as people are born with ties to different areas. This process occurs only very gradually, however. Local ties are still being reallocated 300 years after the change in productivity.

The gradual decline in people’s local ties leads to a gradual decline in population and a gradual increase in real wages. Intuitively, since people are less enthusiastic about living in the area, employers have to offer higher wages, and landlords have to charge lower rents, to attract workers. The eventual population is about one third lower, and wages are about one third higher, than the initial drop.\(^{39}\) The larger initial drop in real wages illustrates a form of hysteresis in the model. Previous declines in productivity can lead to lower levels of real wages that can persist for a long time.

Table 6: Time to convergence after various shocks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Productivity decrease</th>
<th>Population decrease</th>
<th>Years to steady state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initial</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-55</td>
<td>-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-37</td>
<td>-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-19</td>
<td>-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>-12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amenities decrease</th>
<th>Population decrease</th>
<th>Years to steady state</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Initial</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.75</td>
<td>-45</td>
<td>-69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-34</td>
<td>-54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>-20</td>
<td>-32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows the initial and total drop in population (measured in percent), as well as the time it takes to be within one percent of the steady state value after permanent decreases in productivity and amenities of the percent indicated. Initial drop means the drop in population immediately after the shock, while total drop gives the drop from the initial to the steady state level of population. Both are measured as a percentage of the initial population. The next three columns give the time it takes to be within 1 percent of the steady state values. These are separated by the time without a subsidy, the time when there is a subsidy to the area and the difference between the two. The subsidy is assumed to be a 10 percent subsidy that declines by 4 percent each year. For the smallest shocks, the subsidy can be larger than the effect of the shock, since the subsidy does not vary with the size of the initial shock.

The same general patterns apply to different sized declines in both local productivity and local amenities. Table 6 summarizes these results by showing the size of the initial and the eventual drop in both population and real wages, as well as the time that it takes for population to be within 1 percent of its steady state value. Even small changes in productivity and amenities can take generations to be fully reflected in local populations. For example, population is more than one percent away from its steady state value 90 years after a five percent drop in productivity or

\(^{39}\)Intuitively, real wages can decline in this context because of the other, idiosyncratic term in people’s preferences, \(\xi_{ijk}\). The structure of this term means that some people will have a preference for living in this area despite the low real wages, even though they have no local ties in the area. More canonical Rosen-Roback models lack this term. In one of these models, real wages would be equalized across areas.
amenities. Adjustments are even slower after larger changes in productivity, with a 50 percent drop taking 400 years to be fully reflected in local population counts. After a change in productivity or amenities, population falls by about 1/3 less than its total decline.

4 Migration and welfare after local subsidies

Migration elasticities determine local levels of welfare in spatial equilibrium. Higher migration elasticities imply that equal sized changes in labor demand will have smaller effects on wages and other margins of adjustment, like people dropping out of the labor force. Migration also impacts welfare after a subsidy to a particular area. If migration is large enough, then it will undo the effects, in terms of welfare, of a local subsidy. The literature on place based policies, surveyed by Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) and Neumark and Simpson (2015), very much emphasizes this dynamic.

Here I use a sufficient statistics approach, applicable to most models of spatial equilibrium, to show how migration determines the welfare implications of spending in local areas. The logic is straightforward, and it relates to arguments originally made by Harberger (1964); a subsidy to a local area induces misallocations in the form of people moving into that area, when they would prefer to live other places. This misallocation, as it turns out, is actually the only effect on total welfare, since the envelope theorem will apply to any model that begins in undistorted equilibrium.\(^{40}\) The application of the envelope theorem, and the summing of total welfare, mean that this is actually a fairly straightforward application of the sufficient statistics techniques (Chetty (2009)).

It is possible to measure migration elasticities using a two stage least squares, since they are the responses of log population to an increase in log incomes, allowing local prices to change. To instrument for local incomes, I use the two plausibly exogenous changes in labor demand that I identified before, a Bartik shifter in the 1980s and the impact of Chinese imports in the 1990s and early 2000s. I find that migration elasticities are quite low in areas where people have high levels of local ties. Even very large subsidies will cause only small distortions in the local area. In areas with lower levels of local ties, migration elasticities are bigger, but they still are fairly small. Local subsidies in these areas will be more distortionary.

Welfare impacts of local subsidies

To show that migration elasticities are sufficient statistics for welfare, consider the effects of a local stimulus in a general model of spatial equilibrium. For simplicity, I focus on a cash transfer to an area.\(^{41}\) In the model, I have five actors: workers, landlords, local firms, a national firm, and a

\(^{40}\)To my knowledge, the first paper to note that the envelope theorem applied in spatial equilibrium was Busso, Gregory and Kline (2013). Kline and Moretti (2014b) present the idea in the context of a particular parametric model, that provides a good amount of intuition about the effects. Some models, such as the one contained in Suárez Serrato and Zidar (2014), do contain distortions that make the envelope theorem inapplicable. Presumably, however, the literature on analyzing dead weight losses in the presence of other distortions, enjoyably reviewed in Hines (1999), could also give some guidance.
national government. The model is in undistorted spatial equilibrium, before a subsidy is enacted for a particular area, paid for with lump sum taxes levied on other areas.

I add up the welfare of each agent, each converted to a money metric, to provide a measure of total welfare in the economy. For many of the agents, utility can already be thought of in terms of a money metric – profits. For workers, however, I need to convert utility into a money metric. To do this, I use an indirect compensation function, as defined in Varian (1984). Using this construct gives me a measure of equivalent variation due to a change in prices.

For worker $i$, the indirect compensation function, $m_i(w_1, r_1, g_1; w_0, r_0, g_0)$, is a function of an initial menu of wages ($w_0$), rents ($r_0$), and governmental subsidies ($g_0$) across areas, as well as a counterfactual menu of new wages ($w_1$), rents ($r_1$), and subsidies ($g_1$). $m_i(w_1, r_1, g_1; w_0, r_0, g_0)$ measures the additional income needed, at the initial wages, rents, and subsidies, for worker to have the same utility she has at a new set of wages, rents, and subsidies. In other words, $m_i(w_1, r_1, g_1; w_0, r_0, g_0)$ measures equivalent variation.\(^{42}\)

For local landlords, local firms, and national firms, profits will vary depending on the price of inputs and outputs. Landlords’ profits are an increasing function of the level of rents, $\pi^H_j(r_{1,j})$, where $j$ denotes a local area. The assumption is that landlords will develop all parcels of land where the cost is lower than $r_{1,j}$ and gain positive profits off the cheapest parcels of land to develop. In keeping with much of the literature, they do not use labor in the production process.

Local firm profits depend on the cost of labor locally, as well as the price of the local good that they sell, $\pi^Y_j((w_{1,j}, p_{1,j})$. Similarly, the national firm’s profits depend on the price of the tradeable consumption good (normalized to one), relative to the local goods used to make it ($p_1$).

Taking all of these components, and adding in the cost of providing subsidies ($\sum_j g_{1,j}N_{1,j}$, which ignores distortions in raising the tax revenues for a subsidy), gives the total amount of welfare in the model. Note that I have allowed all of these sub-components to have very general functional forms:

\(^{41}\)Other programs should have similar dynamics in terms of migration, so I have not focused on them here. The most obvious distinction is that other consumption focused programs would have a cost that might not exactly equal its benefit to residents. E.g. the public goods that they provide may be worth more, or less, than the cost of providing them. The welfare implications of policies that focus on increasing local firm productivity, or drawing local firms, will similarly depend on migration elasticities, as I show in the context of my parametric model below. I do not attempt to expand my argument to them here, but it should be a straightforward exercise.

\(^{42}\)Compensation functions, also called money-metric utility functions, are described in a more general context in Varian (1984) and more formally in Chipman and Moore (1980). In this case, I use what Chipman and Moore (1980) calls “generalized equivalent variation” to measure welfare, since I am interested in changes from a fixed equilibrium. I follow the literature on spatial equilibrium in performing this money metric aggregation while describing distributional effects by showing impacts on workers, landlords, and firms separately. Note that converting to a money metric and aggregating can be more problematic that it may at first appear. For example, converting to a money metric treats money going to all people equally, ignoring differences in marginal utilities of income and preferences about equality. These different marginal utilities are highlighted in Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz (2008) and distinguishes their setup from later work. Blackorby and Donaldson (1990) formalizes this point and summarizes a large body of work in welfare economics that identifies other problems with the approach, even where equalizing transfers are feasible. Allowing different weights, based on either equality concerns or some idea of marginal utility, might allow local subsidies to increase social welfare, which they never do in this framework. Determining appropriate social welfare weights, of course, is problematic (e.g. Arrow (1950)).
\[ W(w_1, r_1, p_1, g_1) = \sum_i m_i(w_1, r_1, g_1; w_0, r_0, g_0) + \sum_j \left[ \pi_j^H (r_1, j) + \pi_j^Y (w_1, j, p_1, j) - g_1 N_1, j \right] + \pi^Y (p_1) \]

(10)

In this setup, the relevant comparative static is the effect of an increase in \( g_{1,j} \), relative to \( g_{0,j} \equiv 0 \), on total welfare. An increase in \( g_{1,j} \) is literally a cash subsidy to a local area, like the implied subsidy inherent in the income tax system (Albouy (2016)), but it could also be thought of as a program that benefits residents exactly as much as it costs to implement. In this way, they could be programs to improve public spaces, investments in public schools, investments in residential streets, or even programs to pay the college tuitions of the area’s children (e.g. the Kalamzoo Promise program in Kalamazoo, Michigan). These programs may have higher or lower values to residents than the cost of implementing them. None the less, I assume that these costs and benefits balance out, since it is a reasonable starting point for studying a general program, without basing too many conclusions on the specific details of its implementation.

The effect of an increase in \( g_{1,j} \) on total welfare is the total derivative of equation 10 with respect to this increase in \( g_{1,j} \), so it takes into account migration, as well as readjustments due to changes in equilibrium prices. As originally noted by Busso, Gregory and Kline (2013), however, the envelope theorem will apply in this case. Each agent will only want to make very small adjustments in their behavior, since the small change in prices brought on by the program will still leave them quite close to an optimum. This means that I can ignore the effects of re-optimization, since these will have minimal impacts on welfare.\(^{43}\)

The first equation below shows the other effects, which are due to two different types of changes. The first change is in the number of people in the area, which will increase the subsidy payment, since now there are more people to compensate. The envelope theorem, however, means that we do not need to consider differences in people’s welfare as they move, since people who chose to migrate feel that the new area is only marginally better. The second change is in various prices. The changes in prices will mean that some actors will do better than others. For example, if wages fall in response to increased population, then local firms will have lower costs that are exactly equal to the lower level of compensation for local workers. I break out formulas for each actor in the appendix.

\[
\frac{dW}{dg_{1,j}} = \sum_{j'} \left[ \left( H_{j'} - N_{j'} h_{j'} \right) \frac{d}{dg_{1,j'}} \right] + \left( N_{j'} - N_{j'} \right) \frac{dw_{1,j'}}{dg_{1,j'}} + \left( Y_{j'} - Y_{j'} \right) \frac{dp_{1,j'}}{dg_{1,j'}} - \frac{dN_j}{dg_{1,j}} g_{1,j}
\]

where \( H_{j'} \) is the total amount of housing, \( N_{j'} \) is the total population, \( Y_{j'} \) is the total production.

While this model is quite general, it does not include some other dynamics, like frictional unemployment. Schmieder and von Wachter (2016) show how this logic can be extended to frictional unemployment, and how adjustments in terms of search effort (and job finding rates) would similarly drop out of the calculation.
of the local good, and \( h_{j'} \) is the total amount of housing purchased per worker in area \( j' \). Each of these terms measures the total amount of a good purchased (housing, labor, and the final good) in area \( j' \) and multiplies it by the change in its price. Note that I have omitted the before and after subscripts for simplicity.

Since both the buyer and the seller are on equal terms here, however, the transfers all cancel out and the welfare impact only depends on a single term. This term, \( (N_{j'} - N_{j}) \), gives the subsidy payment to workers in the area, minus the cost of that payment for people already residing in the area.

The fact that changes in prices only entail transfers from one party to another means that all of these effects will cancel, leaving only the effect of population changes on the tax necessary to finance the subsidy. This happens in the second line, and it makes the connection to Harberger (1964). The welfare impact of the subsidy is negative and equal to the size of the distortion that it induces in people’s choices about where they would like to live, since some of the subsidy goes to paying to relocate people to places they would not otherwise live.

Figure 10: Dead weight loss due to a location specific subsidy

Figure 10 gives a graphical interpretation of this distortion. It plots the total population of an area, on the x axis, against the subsidy paid to residents, on the y axis. The shaded triangle, labeled DWL, gives the size of the welfare loss, or the dead weight loss. This triangle is the integral of the additional population attracted by the subsidy times the subsidy payment that goes to making them indifferent towards living there. Since the migrants do not gain utility from this portion of this subsidy, this portion is effectively wasted.

In a wide class of models of spatial equilibrium, the welfare implications of a local subsidy are proportional to the subsidy’s effect on migration. Even in models where there are other distortions, or where the programs are more complicated, this will be an important effect. Noting this regularity gives a simple way of thinking about how various public policies impact the distribution of welfare across areas. It formalizes the idea that we should be concerned about population reallocation in response to local subsidies. In a world where areas have different migration elasticities, the formula shows whether it is feasible to change welfare through governmental action in a particular area.
Measuring migration elasticities

It is possible to measure migration elasticities with minimal modeling assumptions by measuring changes in population after exogenous changes in local incomes. So long as one uses an exogenous change in local incomes, and one does not control for changes in local prices, the estimate will embed the effects of people’s preferences about the local area as well as equilibrium changes in prices.

The equation below shows the basic empirical specification that I use to recover the migration elasticity, $\eta_{\text{Mig,j}}$. The migration elasticity, $\eta_{\text{Mig,j}}$, measures the effect of an increase in log incomes on log population, including the endogenous responses of other local prices. Since I intend to include the effects of these other local prices, like housing prices, I do not attempt to control for them. Following the reduced form results, I do control for decade fixed effects, $\gamma_t$, and the standard set of controls from the reduced form regressions, $\beta X_{jt}$. These ensure that the regressions are not being driven by different trends for areas where people are of different ages, different education levels, or places where more people are foreign born, for example. Following my earlier regressions, I allow heterogeneity across areas, $j$, by splitting areas into bins based on their levels of local ties, and also by including a continuous interaction with the level of local ties in each area. I present these variations in Section 2.

$$\Delta p_{jt} = \eta_{\text{Mig,j}} \Delta \text{income}_{jt} + \gamma_t + \beta X_{jt} + \epsilon_{jt}$$

(11)

To isolate plausibly exogenous changes in local incomes, I use both the Bartik shifters in the 1980s and the Chinese import measures in the 1990s and early 2000s. As I discussed in Section 2, each has a good claim at exogeneity in this context.\(^4\) To maximize power, I stack the data for each of the three decades and estimate one set of parameters in the second stage. I allow the Bartik instruments to have different first stage effects than the trade instruments, but I assume the impact of the trade instruments is the same in each decade.\(^5\)

I measure changes in incomes by combining information about changes in wages with information about the availability of jobs, as measured by the employment to population ratio. Wages are an imperfect measure of labor incomes because there appear to be significant frictions to their adjustments, particularly in periods when labor demand is falling. Workers and employees may be reluctant to accept declines in nominal wages, for example, and search frictions could also play a role.\(^6\)

In my empirical setup, labor incomes are the product of wages once one is employed times one’s

---

\(^4\)Another point about the instruments is that the use of labor incomes abstracts from people’s labor leisure choices. In my model, and in much of the literature on spatial equilibrium, an increase in labor incomes has an identical effect as an equivalent increase in local subsidies, because people work for a fixed number of hours in the place where they live. By the logic of the sufficient statistics derivation, however, the impacts on people’s labor leisure choice should fall out from the first order welfare impacts of a local subsidy. Intuitively, people are roughly indifferent about working more or searching harder for a job. The most serious limitation for my empirical work appears to in terms of attracting population; local subsidies may be more or less appealing to migrants than increases in wages.

\(^5\)It is also possible to only use wages. When I only use wages as a measure of labor incomes my results are similar, but much less precise. These results are available upon request.
probability of being employed, as in Harris and Todaro (1970). Potential migrants consider not only wages, but also the difficulty of finding and keeping a job. I use the employment to population ratio as a measure of this probability.

Changes in log labor income, then, are changes in log wages, $\Delta \text{wage}_{jt}$, plus changes in the local employment to population ratio, $\Delta \text{pr}_{jt}$.

$$\Delta \text{income}_{jt} = \Delta \text{wage}_{jt} + \Delta \text{pr}_{jt}$$

**Estimated migration elasticities**

The estimated migration elasticities are significantly lower in areas where people have higher levels of local ties, but they are still fairly modest in areas where people have relatively low levels of local ties. The implication of these relatively low migration elasticities is that local subsidies are the least distortionary in areas where people have many local ties. Distortions are also relatively modest, however, in areas where people have few local ties.

![Table 7: Instrumental variables estimates of migration elasticities](image)

Note: This table shows results from IV regression results, where I use Bartik (for the 1980s) and trade (for the 1990s and early 2000s) shocks as instruments for hourly (residualized) wages. The coefficients on wages are the relevant migration elasticities in each type of area, and the interaction term is multiplied by 100 so it displays more significant digits. Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the state level. P-val: No diff reports the p value against the null hypothesis that there are no differences between areas with different levels of local ties, and the two first state F statistics are the standard Cragg-Donald Wald (partial) F statistic as well as the robust Kleibergen-Paap Wald rank F statistic, in that order. The regression contains 722 commuting zones that are first differenced across four years (so there are three observations per commuting zone). The controls and weights are the same as in the earlier reduced form regressions. Areas with low levels of local ties are areas where less than 60 percent of the population was born in the same state they are currently living in.

Migration elasticities, reported in Table 7 are lower in areas with higher levels of local ties. According to the first column, the migration elasticity is around one in an area with a lower level of local ties, and around one tenth in an area with a higher level of local ties. The linear interaction in the second column implies that a 10 percent increase in the share of people who were born
Figure 11: Estimated migration elasticities

Note: This plots the estimated elasticities from the regression reported in the second column of Table 7, for areas with different levels of local ties. The dotted line is a 95 percent confidence interval.

locally leads to a decrease in the migration elasticity of around 0.35. Figure 11 plots the estimated migration elasticities from this linear interaction and shows that the implication is that areas with very low levels of local ties, e.g. in Miami, where 15 percent of the population was born locally, the migration elasticity is around two. In areas with very high levels of local ties, the estimated migration elasticity reaches zero.\footnote{Appendix Table A11 separates out estimates from the 1980s using the Bartik instruments from later estimates using the trade instruments. It produces qualitatively similar results, but there is some suggestion that migration elasticities were uniformly lower in the later periods. This seems to support several literatures that find that Americans are becoming less and less mobile over time. Note that the estimates are quite imprecise and that there may be some concerns about weak instruments, however. Another robustness exercise, available upon request, is using only wages to measure labor incomes. Using only wages results in migration elasticities that are slightly higher, but much more imprecisely measured, and results in some concerns about the strength of the first stage. None of the specifications give evidence to overturn the finding that migration elasticities are lower in places where people have stronger local ties.}

Table 8 quantifies the welfare implications of local subsidies in areas with different migration elasticities. It measures the welfare cost of the distortion as a percentage of the benefit of the subsidy to the initial population. According to Table 8, a subsidy to an area with a low level of local ties results in a small but meaningful distortion. The same subsidy in an area with a high level of local ties, however, results in a distortion that is economically insignificant. A subsidy equal to 10 percent of an area’s initial wages, for example, leads to a dead weight loss equal to five percent of the subsidy’s payments to the initial population in an area with a migration elasticity of one. In an area with an elasticity of 0.1, however, the distortion is one tenth that size.

In general, the parameter estimates imply that local subsidies will create distortions that are fairly small, particularly in declining areas with high levels of local ties. In fast growing areas, with very low levels of local ties, the distortions could be meaningful after large subsidies, with estimates...
Table 8: Impacts of local subsidies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsidy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>0.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: The table shows the size of deadweight losses brought on by a subsidy for differently sized migration elasticities (columns) and per person subsidies. The deadweight losses are measured as a percentage of the cost of the subsidy, if it were to apply to only the initial population. The size of the subsidy is measured as a percentage of the initial level of income. The highlighted values are the dead weight losses that would apply for a 10 percent subsidy to an area with low ties, and the same subsidy to an area with high ties, according to the first column of Table 7.

implying that these distortions could equal about 20 percent of the size of a decently sized local subsidy. For declining areas, however, there will be very small distortions, even after very large subsidies.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, I examined how people’s ties to declining areas impact migration elasticities and the processes of growth and decline more broadly. I confirm previous findings that people feel strongly about their birth places, which I use as a proxy for most workers’ homes. Using both reduced form regressions and a model of spatial equilibrium, I show how these connections can lead to lower migration elasticities in declining areas. The model shows how heterogeneous migration elasticities have important implications for welfare and for place based policies. The results suggest that declining areas have lower levels of welfare than otherwise might be expected in spatial equilibrium and that targeted place based policies may be particularly effective in declining areas. These results differ substantially from the story of utility equalization in the benchmark model of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982).

Low migration elasticities in declining areas suggest that migration should not equalize utility across areas within countries, leaving room for governmental interventions. In this paper, I have focused on place based policies, and I have modeled them in a somewhat reduced form way, abstracting from details specific to their implementation. This is not to say that these details are unimportant. Several excellent papers have rigorously evaluated individual place based policies that show promise for equalizing welfare in the absence of migration. Indirect place based policies, which Neumark and Simpson (2015) define as policies that seek to move people out of declining areas, may also play a role. My findings suggest that these policies face a difficult battle in convincing people to move from declining areas, but they are also consistent with some barrier to certain people’s migration that may be possible to eliminate. One example might be the lack of social networks in places with more opportunities, which Yannay Spitzer (2015) emphasizes in the
context of international migration.48

A better understanding of why people have local ties would also be of much use to policymakers and to researchers. If, for example, people have strong local ties because they need to care for elderly relatives, then it might make sense for the government to subsidize care in old age. If people have emotional connections to places, on the other hand, then it may not be as reasonable to expect people to move.

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48Examples of studies of direct policies include Busso, Gregory and Kline (2013) (Enterprise Zones), Kline and Moretti (2014a) (The Tennessee Valley Authority), and Bartik and Sotherland (2015) (The Kalamazoo Promise Scholarship program). The Gautreaux (Rubinowitz and Rosenbaum (2000)) and Moving to Opportunity (Ludwig et al. (2013), Chetty, Hendren and Katz (2015)) programs are prominent examples of indirect place based policies, though they move people at a level of geography below the level that I focus on here.


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A Data

A

The data comes primarily from the decennial census and ACS as collected by IPUMS at the University of Minnesota (Ruggles et al. (2010)). Data on the impact of trade on individual local labor markets comes from Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013), and the vital statistics data comes from the NBER. I restrict my sample to prime-aged (16-64 inclusive) people not living in group quarters (barracks and dorms). In computing wages I exclude unpaid family workers and workers who did not work for pay last year. Generally, I aggregate these data up to the Commuting Zone (Tolbert and Sizer (1996)) level and perform my analyses at this level, except in some cases where I focused on states to better match Vital Statistics and migration data.

IPUMS

The data from the US Census comes via the IPUMS sample detailed in Ruggles et al. (2010). I use several PUMS samples: For 1970 I use the form 1 one percent sample at either the state or metro level, depending on whether the analysis uses states or commuting zones. For 1980, 1990, and 2000 I use the five percent samples. For 2008 I use the ACS 3 year estimates from 2006 to 2008. For the bulk of specifications I exclude people residing in group quarters, such as military barracks or dormitories. The only exception is the growth accounting by state that I performed in section two. In that case I include people residing in group quarters because this exclusion might cause me to lose young adults born 16 to 21 years earlier. For worker wages I exclude unpaid family workers and only include people who worked last year. In regressions using commuting zone data in 1970 I exclude 1990 commuting zone number 24600 because I suspect its geographic definition was mis-coded.49

I also compute “labor supply weights” following Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) that weight each worker by their total hours worked last year, and I exclude the top and bottom 1 percent of wages from the computation. All wages are deflated using the personal consumption expenditure chain type price index available from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis via their FRED service. The reference year is 2007.

Vital Statistics

I use datasets containing the data from the US vital statistics (National Center for Health Statistics (2014)) that were created by Jean Roth at the NBER and are available publicly in the NBER website. The only cleaning that I perform on the data is to collapse it (weighting by whether it is a 1 of 2 or full sample for the state year combination I am concerned with) at the state level and convert the alphabetic numbering of states to standard fips codes. To exactly match 16 to 21 year

49Using the commuting zone crosswalks from David Dorn suggests that its population in 1970 was ten times larger than its population in 1980.
olds as of the census data in 1990, I also exclude entries for certain years where the person born would report being 15 or 22 at the time of the survey date.

**Population change accounting**

To investigate demographic changes (births, deaths, aging, and migration) underlying the growth of local areas, I combined data from the US vital statistics with data from the US Census IPUMS to compare the variance of birth rates, aging, and gross migration rates across US states.\(^{50}\) I focus on people over 16 and under 65.

I compute four quantities that show the main drivers of population changes: Births, people aging out of the population 16 to 65, gross in-migration (immigration), and gross out-migration (emigration). Since the census long form asks about migration relative to where a worker was living five years ago, I focus on each over the past five years to make them comparable. Thus, I focus on births 16 to 21 years before the census date, the total number of people in the state aged 55 to 60 in the previous census, the number of current residents living elsewhere five years ago, and the number of people living in the state five years ago, but living elsewhere now. I focus on changes in population between 1980 and 1990, which is the first period where I can use readily available data from the Vital Statistics.

**Birth locations**

The best available data I have access to concerns workers’ states of birth. Unfortunately, this is the most detailed geography that the census bureau asks for, so it is impossible to determine precisely what local labor market a respondent was born in without using an outside data source. Consequently, I tally the proportion of residents of a local labor market who are living in the state of their birth. For large states with many local labor markets (California and Texas are examples) this should lead me to overshoot the proportion of residents living in the area of their birth. For labor markets that cut across state lines (New York for example) I would be understating the proportion of residents living in the same area they were born in. On the one hand, imprecision in the measure of the proportion of residents born in the same labor market is a concern. It is important to note that in a world where areas are not unique islands, the ideal geographic construct may be different in terms of work, family, and other considerations. For example, a worker may prefer to live further away from her parents compared with her work and a worker living in the same state but a different commuting zone as they were born might be almost as constrained as a worker living in the same commuting zone.

Another other issue with the variable is that most births are in hospitals and sometimes children will be born in a hospital in a different state from where their mother lives. Bartik (2009), for example, documents this using data from the PSID. In this situation, the question appears to ask

\(^{50}\)This analysis is for US states based on the ease of matching Vital Statistics geographic identifiers to states. In principle this analysis could be done with local labor markets using publicly available data.
for the state of the hospital, which is a poor proxy for the concepts I am examining. While this variable is far from perfect, its concordance with other measures of a respondent’s local “ties” such as their tenure in their home should suggest that it is still meaningful for this application.

For all of these reasons, I include alternative specifications that use alternative measures of local ties. Generally these results are quite similar.

**Local labor markets**

I define a local area for this project as a Commuting Zone (CZ) defined by Tolbert and Sizer (1996). Commuting Zones are designed to reflect local labor markets where workers live and work, based on commuting data collected in the 1990 Census.\textsuperscript{51} A given CZ can contain multiple states and states can contain multiple CZs. CZs are quite similar to Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) that are more commonly used, but CZs also include rural areas, covering the entire area of each of the 50 states. They are constructed to be an ideal analogue to the areas in traditional models of migration where workers live and work in the same area. To merge the IPUMS data I use in my specification I use the crosswalks created by David Dorn and available via his academic website. For historical charts, I exclude commuting zone 24600, which I believe may be improperly coded in 1970.

**B Growth due to migration and natural changes**

As a first step, I decompose of changes in local population into migration and natural changes (births and aging) across states. Table A2 calculates the components of working age (16-64) population changes by continental US states over the period from 1980 to 1990. It uses estimates of migration from 1985 to 1990 from the 1990 census, age structure information from 1980, and birth data from the vital statistics to compare flows due to migration and natural changes.\textsuperscript{52}

The main implication of the decomposition in Table A2 is that migration is much more important than natural changes in terms of changes in population across the United States. The standard deviation of net migration across continental US states is nearly four times as large as that of natural changes (13.9 against 3.6 percent). Gross migration into areas also varies much more than any other component, suggesting large differences in areas’ abilities to attract workers born elsewhere. This is despite fertility and mortality driving changes in aggregate population. A similar exercise by Berry and Dahmann (1977) produced similar results.

\textsuperscript{51}Different Commuting Zones exist following the 2000 census, however I keep with Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013) and use the 1990 definitions. I do this to keep CZ definitions constant and I use 1990 because it reflects local areas at the beginning of the sample.

\textsuperscript{52}I perform the decomposition across states for convenience and because it coincides with my current measure of a person’s place of birth. I hope to perform it at the level of commuting zones in a later version based on more detailed data about people’s birth places. Additionally, I focus on an age range with relatively low mortality rates in the United States, so differences in morality rates across states should not be large enough to affect the results. More information about the datasets and methodology is contained in the data appendix.
To provide more evidence about the influence of migration relative to natural changes I plot the ratio of gross changes due to migration over gross changes due to natural causes in Figure A2. The figure has two panels: the first plotting flows that increase population, and the second plotting flows that decrease population. In each case a higher value of the ratio means that migration has a larger contribution to a given state’s population dynamics. On the x axis I plot the state’s log change in population, to show how the importance of migration varies with a state’s population growth over the period.

The plots in Figure A2, supporting the earlier evidence, show that migration is more important than natural changes for states that grew. On the left panel, higher population growth is clearly associated with a higher ratio of immigration to births. The relationship is weaker for decreases in population, though it does appear that out migration is important growing states as well as declining ones. For decreases, there is almost no relationship, though a slight positive association emerges if Wyoming is removed from the analysis.

The result that migration drives local growth is consistent with economists understandings of both of migration and fertility. Standard models of migration (e.g. Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982)) predict that areas with attractive amenities will gain population. On the other hand, models of fertility have little to say about fertility in one place or the other. Perhaps the closest connection is through a possible income effect, where richer parents will choose to have more children, so long as children are a normal good. A problem with this argument is the emphasis by Becker (1960) on the quality-quantity trade of in child rearing. For example, Willis (1973) and Becker and Lewis (1973) argue that while parents in areas with higher wages will tend to spend more on children, this may lead them to invest more in the “quality” than the quantity of their children. Previous studies, such as Lindo (2010) and Black et al. (2013), have found that local shocks have relatively small (positive) impacts on fertility.

C Full details of the sufficient statistics derivation

The following are the equilibrium conditions and the effect of a change in \( g_j \) on welfare for each actor in the model presented in the main paper. Note that I omit the 1 and 0 subscripts, except for equations that involve the indirect compensation function. This is for simplicity, and since the equations would apply in either scenario.

**Household**

Household \( i \) maximizes utility subject to a budget constraint:

\[
\max_{j,c_j,h_j,a_j} u(c_j,h_j,a_j) + \xi_{ij}
\]

s.t. \( g_j + w_j = c_j + r_j h_j \)
Where $c_j$ is the level of tradable consumption in area $j$, $h_j$ is its housing (non tradable) consumption in $j$, $a_j$ is the local amenity level, $w_j$ is the wage, $r_j$ is the rent, and $g_j$ is the net governmental transfers. $\xi_{ij}$ is an arbitrary distribution of areas specific preferences household $i$ for area $j$. Workers inelastically provide labor, though this can also be relaxed.

The first order conditions are:

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial c_j} = \lambda_j$$

$$\frac{\partial u}{\partial h_j} = \lambda_j r_j$$

Where $\lambda_j$ is the marginal utility of consumption in area $j$.

To have comparability between households and other actors, I measure households’ welfare using an indirect compensation function (Varian (1984)), using initial prices. Chipman and Moore (1980) calls this “generalized equivalent variation.” The compensation function is defined in the model as

$$m_i(w_1, r_1, g_1; c_{0,j}, h_{0,j}, g_{0,j}, j_0) \equiv e(w_1, r_1, g_1; u(c_{0,j}, h_{0,j}, g_{0,j}) + \xi_{ij0})$$

where $e(\cdot; \cdot)$ is the more common expenditure function, giving the expenditure necessary to equal the initial level of utility, and the subscripts 0 and 1 denote initial values (0) and values after some change (1).\(^{53}\) To get to the indirect compensation function, one simply replaces the initial level of utility with the indirect utility function, at initial prices:

$$m_i(w_1, r_1, g_1; w_0, r_0, g_0) \equiv e(w_1, r_1, g_1; v(w_0, r_0, g_0))$$

After a change in $g_j$, each of the arguments in the function change. Luckily the envelope theorem applies (Small and Rosen (1981), Kline and Moretti (2014b), and Chetty (2009)) so the change in utility is equal to the change in expenditures at the initial levels of consumption, holding location ($j_0$) fixed:

$$\frac{dm_i(w_1, r_1, g_1; w_0, r_0, g_0)}{dg_{1,j}} = e(w_1, r_1, g_1; v(w_0, r_0, g_0))$$

The increase in the subsidy is the first term, but it only appears if the subsidy would apply in the area the household was living in initially. The second term is the change in earnings, and the final is the effect of the change in rents, given the initial level of housing consumption. There is no effect on tradeable good consumption, since it is the numeraire.

**Landlords**

Landlords make the difference between the rent that they charge and their cost of providing housing, $c_j(H_j)$ where $H_j$ is the total amount of housing in areas $j$. $c_j(H_j)$ is (quasi) monotonically

\(^{53}\)If utility is linear in income, as in Busso, Gregory and Kline (2013) and Kline and Moretti (2014b), then the compensation function, at current prices, is the utility.
increasing, since land becomes increasingly costly to develop into good housing as there is less and less available land.

\[
\pi_j^H = \max_{H_j} r_j H_j - \int_0^{H_j} c_j(x) dx
\]

This gives a simple FOC:

\[
r_j = c_j(H_j)
\]

Landlord welfare is \(\pi_j^H\). After a change in subsidies, total profits will change in the following way (based on the envelope theorem):

\[
\frac{\partial \sum_j \pi_j^H}{\partial g_j} = \sum_j \frac{\partial \pi_j^H}{\partial r_j} \frac{\partial r_j}{\partial g_j} = \sum_j H_j \frac{\partial \pi_j^H}{\partial r_j}
\]

**Local firms**

A local firm produces local output \(Y_j\) and sells it at price \(p_j\). It employs local labor and buys capital on a national market at interest rate \(\rho\). The firm’s profit, which it maximizes, is:

\[
\pi_j^Y = \max_{N_j, K_j} p_j Y_j(N_j, K_j) - w_j N_j - \rho K_j
\]

So, the first order conditions are:

\[
\frac{\partial Y_j}{\partial L_j} = \frac{w_j}{p_j} \\
\frac{\partial Y_j}{\partial K_j} = \frac{\rho}{p_j}
\]

The welfare of firms are their profits, \(\pi_j^Y\). Again, because of the envelope theorem, they are only affected in terms of prices after a subsidy into the local area:

\[
\frac{\partial \sum_j \pi_j^Y}{\partial g_j} = \sum_j \frac{\partial \pi_j^Y}{\partial \omega_j} \frac{\partial \omega_j}{\partial g_j} + \frac{\partial \pi_j^Y}{\partial p_j} \frac{\partial p_j}{\partial g_j} = Y_j \frac{\partial p_j}{\partial g_j} - N_j \frac{\partial \omega_j}{\partial g_j}
\]

**The final goods firm**

There is a national firm that takes local output \(Y_j\) and produces the numeraire tradeable consumption good \((Y)\).
\[ \pi^Y = \max_{\text{all } Y_j} Y(Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_J) - \sum_{j'} p_{j'} Y_{j'} \]

So, the first order conditions are, for all \( j \) areas’ goods:

\[ \frac{\partial Y}{\partial Y_j} = p_j \]

The welfare of these firms are their profits, \( \pi^Y \). \( \pi^Y \) may be affected by the subsidy to the areas, since these firms have to pay for their inputs:

\[ \frac{\partial \pi^Y}{\partial g_j} = \sum_{j'} \frac{\partial \pi^Y}{\partial p_{j'}} \frac{\partial p_{j'}}{\partial g_j} = -Y_{j'} \frac{\partial p_{j'}}{\partial g_j} \]

**Aggregation**

I aggregate the welfare of households, landlords, and each type of firm by measuring each in monetary terms and adding each up. There is a continuum of households, and \( N_{0,j} \) of them live in area \( j \) initially, I need to cumulate the effect across all of these households. There is one (representative) landlord and local firm per area, and only one national firm. Adding these up gives the formulation in the main paper. The welfare result, similarly, can be obtained by simply adding up all of the effects on the welfare of various actors.

**D Discussion of factors that lead to local ties**

Residents’ preferences for their places of birth, much like people’s preferences about living in any location, represent many factors. Disentangling these factors is an active and interesting area with many recent contributions. For example, Kennan and Walker (2011), Coate (2013), and Diamond (2016) use structural micro-economic models to estimate residents’ preferences for different areas, including their birth places. Somewhat atypical to this literature, I have remained mostly agnostic about the specific factors that lead workers to have the preferences that I measure, since my basic results do not rely on these distinctions. My reliance on cross sectional snapshots of the population also makes it difficult to credibly disentangle different factors.

The underlying reasons for these measured preferences have implications for possible policy responses, including alternatives to place based policies. One possibility is that the preferences that I measure are the result of other frictions that policies may remove. In this way it may be possible to change their magnitude and move workers out of declining areas. For example, if workers reside in their birth places because of mobility costs, then it may be cost effective to pay workers to migrate. It may also be possible to move a given community, including most of its members,
to a new place with higher productivity in keeping with the spirit of the literature on “dynamic
mobility.”

In this section I briefly discuss several underlying factors that may lead to these measured
preferences. I discuss literatures on social networks, literal migration costs, frictions in the housing
market, information frictions, and endogenous human capital formation. I also include a brief
discussion of endogenous preference formation. My tentative conclusion is many different stories
are consistent with the preference for home areas that I and other researchers have measured. It
seems unlikely that inexpensive interventions will induce workers to move out of declining areas
much more than they already do. A constructive path for future research would be to directly
study these pathways using more detailed micro data.

Networks of people

Some of the most valuable connections people have in a place is the collection of people that they
know. These ties are especially strong with parents and members of a person’s nuclear family at
various points in their lives. Aging parents, in particular, represent a strong tie to particular local
areas, as shown by Konrad and Kunemund (2002), Hank (2007), Rainer and Siedler (2009), and
others. Friends may also have a meaningful influence. For example, Topa (2011) summarizes a
literature on networks and job referrals. Even if workers do not obtain jobs from their contacts,
they may rely on friends and family for informal insurance in difficult times (e.g. Kaplan (2012),
Huttunen and Salvanes (2015)), or for information about particular services and opportunities that
are available locally. Forming new friendships involves significant effort and even if such effort is
expended, the returns are uncertain and it can be difficult to form relationships that are as viable
as relationships that people gave up by moving.

The most relevant economics literature on this phenomenon is the literature examining “dy-
namic mobility.” Carrington, Detragiache and Vishwanath (1996) shows that large scale migration
tends to follow pattern where there tend to be trailblazers who establish links between a sending
and destination community. Significant migration occurs only after these links have been formed.
They show that this is apparent in the great migration of African Americans from the south to the
north of the United States and Yannay Spitzer (2015) shows a similar result for Eastern European
Jews migrating to the United States. This pattern emphasizes that network links between sending
and destination communities are important, and that people tend to migrate in ways that leverage
their social networks.54

54 As this literature shows, racial and ethnic segregation plays an important role in migration. It is difficult,
however, to disentangle how segregation would impact people’s local ties or my setup. Minority groups may have
a smaller choice set of locations that are open to them – either because of discrimination or because of personal
preferences. Bound and Holzer (2000) finds some evidence that less educated blacks are less likely to migrate after a
local demand shock. They also note that gross migration rates are lower for blacks, even within education groups.
Cadena and Kovak (2016) find that immigrants, who often live in segregated communities, migrate in greater numbers
than natives. In my model, a lack of immigrants appears to be lessening migration rates in declining areas since
immigrants have weaker local ties. Another consideration is that specific minority groups may have preferences about
locations that are distinct from other groups. This will lead particular minority groups to be more likely to migrate
if these places become desirable after shocks to their original locations.
If networks are important, then a lack of migration might be because residents lack connections in desirable destinations. It is unclear how this limitation may change with the population dynamics I describe. People may be cutoff in areas where they primarily encounter people born in the same place, since this will tend to make their networks more locally focused. However, if links are formed by trailblazers from sending communities, then the opposite may be the case. An area may reach a tipping point where there are enough people who have migrated to establish a second community in another place.

Another explanation is that people form networks with different numbers of local and non-local links over time. Some people’s networks will be local and others will naturally have many links that come from elsewhere. If the proportion of people with local and non-local links is more or less fixed in growing and declining areas, possibly because the two factors above tend to balance out, then this could generate the patterns I find. People with external links may be more likely to migrate, but people with only local links will be unlikely to. Another scenario might be that some people are highly reliant on networks while others are not, or are able to easily form new ones in destination communities. These differences may be correlated with socioeconomic status, but there may also be other important factors.

**Migration costs**

One explanation is that workers face different mobility costs in different areas that I am not modelling. These different mobility costs may be due to literal differences in the cost of hiring movers or selling a house because of different wage rates, regulation, capital costs, and market thickness in different areas. Credit may also be more or less available, or needed, in areas with different shares of locally born workers.

There are a number of reason why literal mobility costs should play a limited role. The first is the length of the periods that I examine. In the empirical regressions I use a roughly 10 year time frame. This means both that workers have adequate time to save for a move, and also that the move is a small percentage of their consumption over the entire period, so the benefits should be quite large in comparison with the costs. Notably, Blanchard and Katz (1992), suggest that migration responses take roughly 10 years to play out.

A second reason why literal mobility costs may be less important is because gross migration is much larger than net migration. Since people often string together multiple moves, it implies that literal migration costs are a relatively small factor in their decision making. In particular, a person who lives in their state of birth is fairly likely to have lived outside for at least some time. For example, Kennan and Walker (2011) find that roughly 1/4 of all moves in the NLSY79 are back to a respondent’s state of residence at age 14. Decennial census data tells a similar story. Among people living in their state of birth in 2000, nearly half had moved at some point over the past five years, and 3.5 percent had moved home from somewhere outside of the state. While the second number is modest, it is much larger than the effects that I observe over a period that is twice as long.
A third reason is that, because moving involves paying costs in two separate places, there is a limit on the extent that moving costs can differ by sending areas. Since much of the financing of the move should occur in the area that a worker moves to, not the place they are moving from, a worker’s chosen destination should matter more in terms of credit availability than the area they are moving from. Also, even if mobility costs were only paid in the sending area, costs are likely to be lower in declining areas. Wages will tend to be lower, suggesting that movers will cost less, and the typical six percent commission on a real estate sale will also tend to be cheaper in levels.

A final piece of evidence on this channel is the study by Huttunen and Salvanes (2015) examining moves by displaced workers. Their finding that recently displaced (fired or laid off) workers migrate in greater numbers than a control of non-displaced workers suggests that other factors outweigh mobility costs when workers face large earnings losses. They also find that workers tend to move closer to their parents.

**Housing frictions**

Several theories postulate that home ownership might tie people to local areas in ways besides the impact of durable housing, which I addressed earlier. Homeowners may be less likely to move after a decrease in local housing prices because loss aversion makes them less willing to suffer the capital loss or because it makes it harder for them to afford a new down payment. This effect may dominate the increased number of foreclosures in areas with declines in home prices, and negative economic shocks more broadly. Another theory, originally advanced by Oswald (1996), is that the transaction cost of selling a house are large enough depress migration, and therefore increase the unemployment rate.

One concern is that the local ties that I observe are entirely explained by these frictions in the housing market, perhaps as brought about by larger declines in housing prices in declining areas. Tables A9 and A10 address this concern by allowing the effect of a local labor demand shock to vary based on local ties and the level and lagged changes in rents. I find that my results are similar and in some cases stronger.

The finding that ties appear stronger than changes in housing prices is not surprising given previous literature on housing lock in. Evidence on the effects of house price declines on migration is mixed.\(^{55}\) One fairly consistent finding, however, is that effects on the labor market are small. Modestino and Dennett (2012) squares this with their finding of meaningful effects on migration among homeowners by noting that only about 20 percent of migrants are homeowners. Even if home owners are much less likely to move, a somewhat controversial claim, then renters may undo the labor market impacts.

More broadly, there are many reasons to suspect that owning a house will tie people to individual

\(^{55}\)Farber (2011) and Bricker and Brian Bucks (2013) find small or no effects of house price decreases on migration, Molloy, Smith and Wozniak (2011) and Donovan and Schnure (2011) find effects only for small distance moves, and Henley (1998), Ferreira, Gyorko and Tracy (2010), and Modestino and Dennett (2012) find some effects for longer distance moves. Farber (2011), Modestino and Dennett (2012), and Valletta (2013) find that homeowners’ negative equity does not appear to affect the labor market.
areas. The most obvious is the high transaction costs that are associated with selling a house. This
effect is complicated, however, by the fact that people choose to become homeowners knowing these
costs. Since many people are inframarginal about migration, and migration is more common among
younger households who are less likely to own, the effect may be small. In terms of determining
a causal effect, this selection issue has complicated previous investigations, which have produced
mixed results.\textsuperscript{56} Housing frictions may amplify other ties that people have to places, but available
evidence about them is mixed.

**Information**

Information about relevant alternatives is an important factor in the migration process. The recent
literature on migration, following Kennan and Walker (2011), places a great deal of emphasis on
information and its ability to explain repeated moves. Within a framework of net migration, limits
on information may increase effective mobility costs of people who decide to move. These factors
likely interact with other preferences about homes, since Kennan and Walker (2011) and Gregory
(2013) find that people’s preferences about their homes are not completely explained by information
frictions. Schmutz and Sidibe (2016) argue that frictions in job finding rates for movers can explain
more, though they still find that mobility costs are substantial.

Levels of information may vary across places or among people in a given place giving rise to
differences in people’s choices. Particular places might have worse information because of physical
geography, economic geography, migration patterns, vacation patterns, availability of information
resources like the internet, or other factors. Declining areas could be more isolated than other
areas, so this may influence the process. Another possibility is that different people within an
area are differentially informed about outside opportunities and that this is relatively constant
across areas. If this were true then it might behave in a way similar to a difference in costs across
residents. It seems that most implications of information for net migration flows will be modeled
in my framework, though with different interpretations.

Establishing how well information about far off alternatives circulates to particular areas appears
to be an interesting target for future research. One factor that may limit information’s implications
in this context is that there are several incentives for “arbitrage” on the part of employers if workers
are misinformed in a particular area, however.

**Endogenous human capital**

Another explanation is that workers have location specific human capital. This area specific human
capital could be job related skills, or information about the local area. This could mean that workers
prefer to leave their birth states, but would suffer large wage losses if they did.

There are several reasons to suspect that workers have substantial location specific human capital.
Topa (2011) summarizes a large literature that emphasizes the importance of local social ties

\textsuperscript{56}Coulson and Fisher (2009) is a recent investigation that contains a review of earlier studies.
for job referrals. These may take many years to form. Local knowledge might also be particularly valuable if workers interact with specific laws, regulations, business structures, contacts, or natural features.

An emphasis on local human capital, however, is somewhat counter-intuitive given the fairly robust finding that college educated workers are significantly more likely to migrate than less skilled workers. A literature on job specific human capital, including Blatter, Muehlemann and Schenker (2012) and Hudomiet (2014), that suggests that job specific human capital is higher for more skilled workers. In particular, agglomeration effects should lead workers to be less mobile if they have skills that are industry specific and the industry is highly concentrated. An example of this might be an investment banker in New York.57

Location specific human capital might be inversely correlated with overall human capital if it is an inferior good. Unions have historically been more important for low skilled workers and union jobs may be controlled on the basis of local connections. These jobs may be more valuable for less skilled individuals; for example, this might be true if unions tend to compress the wage distribution. Local licensing also may bind more in the low skilled labor market. Kleiner and Krueger (2013) suggest that licensing may be moving in such a way that the rise of licencing and fall of unions roughly offset each other in terms of the number of workers affected by either.

There seems to be very limited scope for policies to affect workers’ levels of location specific human capital. Referral networks appear to serve a valuable role in conveying information about job applicants and location specific skills are by definition valuable for productivity in particular local areas. Some political institutions, like recent state licensing laws, may be possible to change, but political economy considerations may complicate these efforts. Voters may reward local politicians who enact policies that advantage people with local connections.58

**Endogenous preferences**

Workers may develop preferences for particular places based upon spending time in a place. In particular, many activities involve fixed cost that may have to be paid again if one were to move to a new location. Children may participate in activities, play certain sports, cheer for particular sports teams, or eat certain foods that may only be popular in particular places. For children in particular, some of these affiliations may be malleable, since many take up different sports as adults, but preferences for food may be much more fixed in adulthood. Adults as well may develop particular local affiliations, such as membership in local clubs, knowledge about certain local features like hiking trails, local resources like bookstores, local community groups, or local activities. Patterns of dressing, tastes for home styles and decor, language differences, political

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57 Agglomeration effects in training, for example in PhD Economists, may make skilled workers more mobile since they often spend extended periods in unfamiliar locations. Workers in these occupations experience many different areas so they might be expected to have fewer ties to individual areas.

58 Anthropologist Scott (1998) argues that there is a fundamental political tension between local and central control. This can lead to policies that are intentionally designed to make local knowledge more valuable. He argues that the process of constructing a nation state like France involved replacing these policies. He argues that this process has had many unintended negative consequences.
affiliations, and many other cultural factors likely contribute to this.

Endogenous preference formation most likely interacts with other factors. So, for example, many social relationships may be based around particular local activities. Individual participants may not enjoy specific activities more than alternatives in other places, but they value the social interactions that they get out of these activities, and these might be hard to form elsewhere. Married couples may be tied down by one spouse’s like for particular local rituals. Children may find it optimal for parents to move, but parents may be tied to particular places by their preferences for particular local activities. Workers may also be more willing to invest in location specific human capital or make decisions that increase their mobility costs if they enjoy living in their current area.

Policy implications

The main policy implication from this discussion is that it may be possible to remove some of the reasons for some people’s unwillingness to migrate. If it were cost effective to induce people to migrate from declining areas without decreasing their welfare by very much, then this would obviously be a solution to a host of local economic problems.

The cheapest friction to eliminate would be a direct mobility cost driven by limited access to credit. Unfortunately, available evidence suggests that this mechanism is unlikely to drive most of the effects that I document. Access to credit could be beneficial in a number of other ways – such as encouraging education, small business formation, and other productive investments – but it appears unlikely to be much more valuable in this area than in others. A reasonable first step in this area would be to allow easier transfer of benefits between different state programs. While available evidence suggests this might have a small impact, it presumably can be done at relatively low cost and it is difficult to imagine how it would harm welfare.

Another possibility would be to create links from declining areas to other growing areas. This could involve encouraging the migration of influential “trailblazers” and their continued integration in sending communities, or by establishing agencies devoted to establishing workers in other places. A problem with this approach is that it would be difficult for any governmental agency to properly assess needs for migration services. It also is not clear that a market failure is at work – an employer in a growing area, for example, would have an incentive to hire workers from declining areas at cheaper wages if it were to recruit in those areas. Such programs might also face political pressure in sending communities since they would be designed to de-populate them and reduce their influence. More subtle policies, such as the integration of local employment agencies, or the standardization of state level credentials would be likely to help. An additional benefit is that these would also improve labor market “fluidity” across all areas, and not necessarily only declining ones.

Many of the other explanations for people’s preferences involve factors that are either costly or impossible to adjust. If all preferences are formed in childhood, for example, then an area would only gradually lose its appeal as a smaller and smaller proportion of the population grows up there. The system would eventually return to a “steady state” equilibrium where population reflects the common valuations of productivity and consumption amenities that are common in a Rosen-Roback
framework, but this evolution would be much slower than is commonly assumed. Compensatory place based policies might slow this evolution, but since they do not change population by very much, they are likely to have small effects.
Appendix tables and figures

Table A1: Association between populations of locals and outsiders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pct chg in population born outside</th>
<th>Pct chg in population born locally</th>
<th>(0.05)</th>
<th>(0.04)</th>
<th>(0.04)</th>
<th>(0.03)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weighted</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.287</td>
<td>0.434</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Coefficients are from a regression of changes in the population born locally on the change in population born outside over the period from 1980 to 2008 for the 722 commuting zones in the continental US. Each is measures as a percentage of the initial population (including all people). Data are from the long form 1980 decennial Census and the 2006-2008 ACS. Data are are weighted to be nationally representative. Locals are people who are born in the state they are living in, while outsiders are born in other states or countries.

Table A2: Components of population changes from 1980 to 1990

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Std</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Net Migration</td>
<td>13.78</td>
<td>4.02</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural changes</td>
<td>3.69</td>
<td>9.96</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Immigration</td>
<td>14.82</td>
<td>29.73</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Births</td>
<td>2.81</td>
<td>24.55</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emigration</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>25.71</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aging</td>
<td>1.48</td>
<td>15.66</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Standard deviations and means are expressed as a percentage of the initial population for all continental US states with equal weights. For example, a state with 100,000 births and 1,000,000 in initial population would have a value of 10 percent for births. Data are from the decennial census and vital statistics (National Center for Health Statistics (2014)) covering the continental United States. Births are from 1969 to 1974, aging is the population 55 to 60 in the 1980 decennial census, and migration statistics are from the 1990 census. Migration includes moves from abroad but not moves from the state to abroad, since the sample only includes people who are in the United States when the census was conducted. Each is multiplied by two to represent total population movements over 1980 to 1990. Net migration is immigration minus emigration and “natural” changes are births minus aging out of the age range. Immigration and emigration are relative to states, not countries, and population in this context is the population of people aged 16-64.
Table A3: Persistence of population changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Large</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Large</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lagged pct chg in population</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Twice lagged pct chg in population</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thrice lagged pct chg in population</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>1444</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.569</td>
<td>0.678</td>
<td>0.702</td>
<td>0.831</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Results are from an autoregression of changes in population on lags of itself. “All” denotes results using all commuting zones, “Large” denotes commuting zones that had populations of more than 1 million people initially. Data is from the decennial census and ACS. Regressions are weighted by initial population and standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by state (a CZ is in a state if the plurality of its population resides there). Year fixed effects are included for panel regressions.

Table A4: Locally born workers staying and population changes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Percent of people born in the state staying</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1970-2008 log change in working age population</td>
<td>0.09 (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Controls</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.170</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Data is from the decennial census and ACS and cover the continental United States. Regressions are weighted by initial population and robust standard errors are in parenthesis. All share variables are multiplied by 100 to make them into percentage points. Controls are share college educated, share employed, share foreign born, share born in Mexico, and log population – all measured in 1970. The share of workers born in the same state includes all adults 16-65 born in that state and living somewhere in the United States from 2006-2008 (the ACS 2008 3 year sample window).

Table A5: Associations between ADH and Bartik instruments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Bartik</th>
<th>ADH trade exposure</th>
<th>ADH IV</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bartik</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADH trade exposure</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADH IV</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.73</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Correlation coefficients are shown between instrumental variables related to Chinese import competition and Bartik labor demand instruments. The table describes the correlation between a given CZs Bartik instrument for 1980 to 1990 against its Chinese import exposure for 1990-2000, then again for 2000-2008. I use population weights at the beginning of the period relevant for the Chinese import shock.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>NILF</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>LFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bartik: Low ties</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>1.85</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bartik: High ties</strong></td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P-val: No diff</strong></td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.53</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel B: Triple difference specification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>NILF</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>LFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Interaction</strong></td>
<td>-3.70</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>-3.50</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>-0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.15)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.12)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
<td>(0.74)</td>
<td>(0.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Main effect</strong></td>
<td>1.10</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(0.17)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Percent locals</strong></td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.21)</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R²</strong></td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Observations</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>722</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: CZ level results with statistics including only men aged 16-65. Weighted by initial population with clustered (by state) standard errors and controls as in table 3. See table 3 for full notes.
Table A7: Bartik shocks by share born locally: Women only

Panel A: Bins specification

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Pop</th>
<th>NILF</th>
<th>Unemp</th>
<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>LFP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bartik: Low ties</td>
<td>2.48</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>1.29</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<tr>
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Panel B: Triple difference specification

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<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>LFP</th>
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Notes: CZ level results with statistics including only women aged 16-65. Weighted by initial population with clustered (by state) standard errors and controls as in table 3. See table 3 for full notes.
Table A8: Bartik shocks by local average household tenure

Panel A: Bins specification

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<th>Wages</th>
<th>Rents</th>
<th>LFP</th>
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<td>(0.04)</td>
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<td>Bartik: High ties</td>
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<td>0.60</td>
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<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0.55</td>
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Panel B: Triple difference specification

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<th>Emp</th>
<th>Wages</th>
<th>Rents</th>
<th>LFP</th>
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<tr>
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<td>0.10</td>
<td>-0.06</td>
<td>-0.00</td>
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<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
<td>(0.09)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
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<td>Main effect</td>
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<td>1.00</td>
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<td>0.48</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.18)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg time in house</td>
<td>2.69</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
<td>2.88</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>2.85</td>
<td>0.47</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(1.69)</td>
<td>(0.58)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.66</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.40</td>
<td>0.56</td>
<td>0.41</td>
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<tr>
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</table>

Notes: Regression coefficients are plotted for either the main effect plus a linear interaction term with the demeaned average household tenure in the CZ, or the coefficient separately estimated for CZs with fewer or more than 8 years of average household tenure. Controls, measured in 1980, are: the household tenure variable used in the interaction term, the share of working age adults outside the labor force, unemployed, foreign born, having entered the state in the past five years, and the share of adults who are under 35 and 50 to 65. Results are weighted by initial population with clustered (by state) standard errors and controls as in table 3. See table 3 for additional notes.
Table A9: Bartik regressions including other interactions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interaction</th>
<th>Log population</th>
<th>Log NILF</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ties interaction</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>-2.38</td>
<td>-4.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>(1.21)</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
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<td>Bartik shock</td>
<td>0.91</td>
<td>1.02</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.32)</td>
<td>(0.28)</td>
<td>(0.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent locals</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
<td>0.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td>(0.25)</td>
<td>(0.24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct under 35 interaction</td>
<td>27.13</td>
<td>10.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(15.44)</td>
<td>(4.46)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct 50 to 64 interaction</td>
<td>38.09</td>
<td>12.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(13.23)</td>
<td>(4.49)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct college interaction</td>
<td>-9.01</td>
<td>-2.81</td>
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<tr>
<td>(2.56)</td>
<td>(0.75)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pct employed interaction</td>
<td>-15.23</td>
<td>-5.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(1.13)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rents interaction</td>
<td>-1.49</td>
<td>-0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2.09)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pos rent chgs interaction</td>
<td>5.09</td>
<td>1.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1.89)</td>
<td>(0.56)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neg rent chgs interaction</td>
<td>3.63</td>
<td>1.55</td>
</tr>
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<td>(3.29)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Main Controls</td>
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<td>722</td>
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<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
<td>0.474 0.604 0.629 0.626 0.637 0.621</td>
<td>0.313 0.547 0.576 0.575 0.593 0.591</td>
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</table>

Notes: Regressions, as explained in the text, using shift share (Bartik) demand indexes and data from the decennial censuses in 1980 and 1990 for individual commuting zones in the US. In addition to the setup described in table 3, these also control for the main effect of the interaction term, if it is not already included.
Table A10: Trade regressions including other interactions

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<tr>
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<td>(0.61)</td>
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<td>Percent locals</td>
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<td>(0.07)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pct under 35 interaction</td>
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<td>Pct employed interaction</td>
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<td>(5.36)</td>
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<td>Rents interaction</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
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<td>Pos rent chgs interaction</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(2.96)</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neg rent chgs interaction</td>
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<td>( R^2 )</td>
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Notes: Regressions using a shift share index of trade in final goods’ impact on local commuting zones in the US in first differences for the periods from 1990 to 2000 and 2000 to 2008. Data come from the decennial census and three year ACS. In addition to the setup described in table 4, these also control for the main effect of the interaction term, if it is not already included.
### Table A11: Instrumental variables estimates of migration elasticities, separately

#### Panel A: Bartik

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<td>Main effect of wages</td>
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<td>Main effect of ties</td>
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#### Panel B: Trade

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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
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<td>54.1</td>
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Note: This breaks out IV results using the Bartik and trade shocks in separate specifications. Otherwise, it follows the methodology in Table 7.
Notes: Plotted are changes in the total population of people who were born outside of (inside) their current state, from 1980 to 2008, divided by the total population of the commuting zone in 1980 and multiplied by 100. In this way it represents the contribution of this population group to changes in the commuting zone’s population. Data are from the long form decennial census and the ACS 3 year estimates (2006-2008) and are weighted to be nationally representative. The unit of observation is a commuting zone within the continental United States. The figure excludes the small number of commuting zones where the each statistic was over 150 so it is easier to read. Regressions in Table A1 include them, however.
Figure A2: Ratios of migration and non-migration population changes

Notes: Data are from the decennial census and vital statistics (National Center for Health Statistics (2014)). Births are from 1969 to 1974, aging is the population 55 to 60 in the 1980 decennial census, and migration statistics are from the 1990 census. The regression line is an OLS regression using each state as an observation. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Figure A3: Correlations between 10 year changes in working age population
Figure A4: Population changes and locally born workers staying

Panel A: Unadjusted

Panel B: Residualized

Panel C: Unadjusted and weighted

Panel D: Residualized and weighted

Note: Plotted are either the observed share born locally, or residuals of a regression of the share locally born residuals on a series of controls, with the constant added back in after. The controls are: share college educated, share employed, share foreign born, share born specifically in Mexico, and population 40 years previously. The line is from an OLS or WLS regression and the standard error is clustered by census division.
Notes: The 722 commuting zones in the continental US are shaded according to how long the average “householder,” in whose name the residence is owned/rented, has been living at their current residence. The statistic is weighted according to the number of adults 16-64, fulfilling other sample restrictions, who live at that residence. Darker shades mean longer average times living in the residence. Data are from responses to the 2000 long form census via IPUMS.
Figure A6: Local labor demand shocks

Panel A: Bartik shocks: 1980 to 1990

Panel B: Trade shocks: 1990 to 2000

Panel C: Trade shocks: 2000 to 2008

Note: The figure plots commuting zones shaded based on the severity of the local labor demand shock in the period. Data are from the Decennial Census, ACS, and Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013).
Figure A7: Scatterplot of ADH and Bartik instruments

Note: Scatterplots are shown between instrumental variables related to Chinese import competition and Bartik labor demand instruments. The figure describes the correlation between a given CZ's Bartik instrument for 1980 to 1990 against its Chinese import exposure for 1990-2000. I use population weights at the beginning of the period relevant for the Chinese import shock.